Israel

[Typhoon]

Economist | A lament for America’s Jews

ELECTIONS are to special-interest groups what spinach is to Popeye. So it was no surprise that the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) at the beginning of this month produced the usual pandering. Barack Obama, Arab-Israeli peacemaking on hold, said that when the chips were down “I have Israel’s back”. When Mitt Romney’s video address began, one wicked tweet wondered whether the Republican candidate would promise to make his inauguration speech from Jerusalem. In the event, he promised only to make Jerusalem his first port of call as president.

In recent years, however, mighty AIPAC has had to cope with an irritant: a small but dogged competitor. On March 24th a different group of American Jews will meet in downtown Washington at the conference of the organisation known as J Street. J Street is growing, though still a tiddler by AIPAC standards. It now has 50-odd staffers, and has lined up Ehud Olmert, Israel’s former prime minister, as next week’s keynote speaker.

The J Streeters are peaceniks, always banging on about the two-state solution. AIPAC says it is neutral in Israeli politics, but is closer to Israel’s Likud. J Streeters fret about the stateless Palestinians and the damage Israel’s occupation of the West Bank does to its soul. The question at AIPAC is when Mr Obama will send his bombers to squish Iran’s nuclear ambitions. At first glance, this looks like a quarrel about foreign policy. But what if something else is at stake: the future of American Jewry itself?

Enter Peter Beinart, a political scientist and former editor of the liberal (and pro-Israel) weekly, the New Republic. At J Street next week he will launch a book, “The Crisis of Zionism” (Times Books), which has already sent plenty of people into a spin.

[Parodite]

Haaretz : Many factors are fast rendering the two-state concept impracticable

One (bi-ethnic / bi-national) state solution is preferable and in theory always possible. But too much happened and for too long to make it a viable option now in my opinion. If they first learn to live long enough as neighbors in a two state solution, merging one day into one state succesfully is more likely to succeed.

In either case: Israel should stop expanding settlements in the Westbank and remove those outside the '67 borders, and the Palestinians should stop blowing up buses et-al and behave with more decency. Problem: easier said than done. Extremists on both sides hijacked the situation and it is very easy to destroy any political progress.

Hamas in Gaza is another issue. Israel under Sharon dismantled all settlements Gaza but Hamas came to power and still declares itself being in a state of war with Israel proper.

[Endovelico]

Israel's New Strategic Environment
By George Friedman - April 3, 2012

Israel is now entering its third strategic environment. The constant threat of state-on-state war defined the first, which lasted from the founding of the Jewish state until its peace treaty with Egypt. A secure periphery defined the second, which lasted until recently and focused on the Palestinian issue, Lebanon and the rise of radical Sunni Islamists. The rise of Iran as a regional power and the need to build international coalitions to contain it define the third.

Israel's fundamental strategic problem is that its national security interests outstrip its national resources, whether industrial, geographic, demographic or economic. During the first phase, it was highly dependent on outside powers -- first the Soviet Union, then France and finally the United States -- in whose interest it was to provide material support to Israel. In the second phase, the threat lessened, leaving Israel relatively free to define its major issues, such as containing the Palestinians and attempting to pacify Lebanon. Its dependence on outside powers decreased, meaning it could disregard those powers from time to time. In the third phase, Israel's dependence on outside powers, particularly the United States, began increasing. With this increase, Israel's freedom for maneuver began declining.

Containing the Palestinians by Managing its Neighbors

The Palestinian issue, of course, has existed since Israel's founding. By itself, this issue does not pose an existential threat to Israel, since the Palestinians cannot threaten the Israeli state's survival. The Palestinians have had the ability to impose a significant cost on the occupation of the West Bank and the containing of the Gaza Strip, however. They have forced the Israelis to control significant hostile populations with costly, ongoing operations and to pay political costs to countries Israel needs to manage its periphery and global interests. The split between Hamas and Fatah reduced the overall threat but raised the political costs. This became apparent during the winter of 2008-2009 during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza when Hamas, for its own reasons, chose to foment conflict with Israel. Israel's response to Hamas' actions cost the Jewish state support in Europe, Turkey and other places.

Ideological or religious considerations aside, the occupation of the territories makes strategic sense in that if Israel withdraws, Hamas might become militarized to the point of threatening Israel with direct attack or artillery and rocket fire. Israel thus sees itself forced into an occupation that carries significant political costs in order to deal with a theoretical military threat. The threat is presently just theoretical, however, because of Israel's management of its strategic relations with its neighboring nation-states.

Israel has based its management of its regional problem less on creating a balance of power in the region than on taking advantage of tensions among its neighbors to prevent them from creating a united military front against Israel. From 1948 until the 1970s, Lebanon refrained from engaging Israel. Meanwhile, Jordan's Hashemite regime had deep-seated tensions with the Palestinians, with Syria and with Nasserite Egypt. In spite of Israeli-Jordanian conflict in 1967, Jordan saw Israel as a guarantor of its national security. Following the 1973 war, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel that created a buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula.

By then, Lebanon had begun to shift its position, less because of any formal government policy and more because of the disintegration of the Lebanese state and the emergence of a Palestine Liberation Organization presence in southern Lebanon. Currently, with Syria in chaos, Jordan dependent on Israel and Egypt still maintaining the treaty with Israel despite recent Islamist political gains, only Lebanon poses a threat, and that threat is minor.

The Palestinians therefore lack the political or military support to challenge Israel. This in turn has meant that other countries' alienation over Israeli policy toward the Palestinians has carried little risk. European countries opposed to Israeli policy are unlikely to take significant action. Because political opposition cannot translate into meaningful action, Israel can afford a higher level of aggressiveness toward the Palestinians.

Thus, Israel's strongest interest is in maintaining divisions among its neighbors and maintaining their disinterest in engaging Israel. In different ways, unrest in Egypt and Syria and Iran's regional emergence pose a serious challenge to this strategy.

Egypt

Egypt is the ultimate threat to Israel. It has a huge population and, as it demonstrated in 1973, it is capable of mounting complex military operations.

But to do what it did in 1973, Egypt needed an outside power with an interest in supplying Egypt with massive weaponry and other support. In 1973, that power was the Soviet Union, but the Egyptians reversed their alliance position to the U.S. camp following that war. Once their primary source of weaponry became the United States, using that weaponry depended heavily on U.S. supplies of spare parts and contractors.

At this point, no foreign power would be capable of, or interested in, supporting the Egyptian military should Cairo experience regime change and a break with the United States. And a breach of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty alone would not generate a threat to Israel. The United States would act as a brake on Egyptian military capabilities, and no new source would step in. Even if a new source did emerge, it would take a generation for the Egyptians to become militarily effective using new weapon systems. In the long run, however, Egypt will remain Israel's problem.

Syria

The near-term question is Syria's future. Israel had maintained a complex and not always transparent relationship with the Syrian government. In spite of formal hostilities, the two shared common interests in Lebanon. Israel did not want to manage Lebanon after Israeli failures in the 1980s, but it still wanted Lebanon -- and particularly Hezbollah -- managed. Syria wanted to control Lebanon for political and economic reasons and did not want Israel interfering there. An implicit accommodation was thus possible, one that didn't begin to unravel until the United States forced Syria out of Lebanon, freeing Hezbollah from Syrian controls and setting the stage for the 2006 war.

Israel continued to view the Alawite regime in Syria as preferable to a radical Sunni regime. In the context of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the threat to Israel came from radical Sunni Islamists; Israel's interests lay with whoever opposed them. Today, with the United States out of Iraq and Iran a dominant influence there, the Israelis face a more complex choice. If the regime of President Bashar al Assad survives (with or without al Assad himself), Iran -- which is supplying weapons and advisers to Syria -- will wield much greater influence in Syria. In effect, this would create an Iranian sphere of influence running from western Afghanistan to Iraq, Syria and into Lebanon via Hezbollah. It would create a regional power. And an Iranian regional power would pose severe dangers to Israel.

Accordingly, Israel has shifted its thinking from supporting the al Assad regime to wanting it to depart so that a Sunni government hostile to Iran but not dominated by radical Islamists could emerge. Here we reach the limits of Israeli power, because what happens in Syria is beyond Israel's control. Those who might influence the course of events in Syria apart from Iran include Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Both are being extremely cautious in their actions, however, and neither government is excessively sensitive to U.S. needs. Israel's main ally, the United States, has little influence in Syria, particularly given Russian and, to some extent, Chinese opposition to American efforts to shape Syria's future.

Even more than Egypt, Syria is a present threat to Israel, not by itself but because it could bring a more distant power -- Iran -- to bear. As important, Syria could threaten the stability of the region by reshaping the politics of Lebanon or destabilizing Jordan. The only positive dimension for Israel is that Iran's military probably will not be able to deploy significant forces far from its borders for many years. Iran simply lacks the logistical or command capabilities for such an operation. But developing them is just a matter of time. Israel could, of course, launch a war in Syria. But the challenge of occupying Syria would dwarf the challenge Israel faces with the Palestinians. On the other side of the equation, an Iranian presence in Syria could reshape the West Bank in spite of Shiite-Sunni tensions.

The United States and the Europeans, with Libya as a model, theoretically could step into managing Syria. But Libya was a seven-month war in a much less populous country. It is unlikely they would attempt this in Syria, and if they did, it would not be because Israel needed them to do so. And this points to Israel's core strategic weakness. In dealing with Syria and the emergent Iranian influence there, Israel is incapable of managing the situation by itself. It must have outside powers intervening on its behalf. And that intervention poses military and political challenges that Israel's patron, the United States, doesn't want to undertake.

It is important to understand that Israel, after a long period in which it was able to manage its national security issues, is now re-entering the phase where it cannot do so without outside support. This is where its policy on the Palestinians begins to hurt, particularly in Europe, where intervention on behalf of Israeli interests would conflict with domestic European political forces. In the United States, where the Israeli-Palestinian problem has less impact, the appetite to intervene in yet another Muslim country is simply not there, particularly without European allies.

Iran

This is all compounded by the question of Iranian nuclear weapons. In our view, as we have said, the Iranians are far closer to a controlled underground test than to a deliverable weapon. Israel's problem is that Iran appears on the verge of a strategic realignment in the region. The sense that Iran is an emerging nuclear power both enhances Iran's position and decreases anyone's appetite to do anything about it. Israel is practicing psychological warfare against Iran, but it still faces a serious problem: The more Iran consolidates its position in the Middle East and the closer it is to a weapon the more other countries outside the region will have to accommodate themselves to Iran. And this leaves Israel vulnerable.

Israel cannot do much about Syria, but a successful attack on Iranian nuclear facilities could undermine Iranian credibility at a time when Israel badly needs to do just that. Here again, Israel faces its strategic problem. It might be able to carry out an effective strike against Iran, particularly if, as has been speculated, a country such as Azerbaijan provides facilities like airfields. However, even with such assistance, Israel's air force is relatively small, meaning there is no certainty of success. Nor could Israel strike without American knowledge and approval. The Americans will know about an Israeli strike by technical intelligence. Hiding such a strike from either the Americans or Russians would be difficult, compounding the danger to Israel.

More important, Israel cannot strike Iran without U.S. permission because Israel cannot guarantee that the Iranians would not mine the Strait of Hormuz. Only the United States could hope to stop the Iranians from doing so, and the United States would need to initiate the conflict by taking out the Iranian mine-laying capability before the first Israeli strike. Given its dependence on the United States for managing its national security, the decision to attack would have to be taken jointly. An uncoordinated attack by Israel would be possible only if Israel were willing to be the cause of global economic chaos.

Israel's strategic problem is that it must align its strategy with the United States and with anyone the United States regards as essential to its national security, such as the Saudis. But the United States has interests beyond Israel, so Israel is constantly entangled with its patron's multiplicity of interests. This limits its range of action as severely as its air force's constraints do.

Since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli dependence on outsiders was limited. Israel could act on issues like settlements, for example, regardless of American views. That period is coming to an end, and with it the period in which Israel could afford to deviate from its patron. People frequently discuss any U.S.-Israeli rift in terms of personal relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but this is mistaken. It is uncertainty in Egypt and Syria and the emergence of Iran that have created a new strategic reality for Israel.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/israels- ... f31d40055b

I'm always suspicious of Stratfor's intentions, but the present analysis seems sound enough.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

Told you guys all this BullShit


The reason for this silence on the part of the national security sector, just as the Israeli threat of war was escalating sharply, appears to be a widespread view among Israeli national security analysts that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's threat to attack is a highly successful bluff.


All this garbage just to squeeze you guys our of more dough, free this free that, Rhubarb's usual game

.
Some critics of Netanyahu's threat to go war against Iran have expressed concern about the failure of national security figures to speak out publicly against the policy. Former Jerusalem Post columnist Larry Derfner, who now blogs for the independent web-based magazine 972, wrote last month that there are "crowds" of former military and intelligence officials who privately oppose an attack on Iran and who could slow the "march to war" by speaking to the news media.

But he complained that "Israelis aren't hearing their voices".

Yossi Alpher, a former Mossad analyst and later head of the Jaffee Center for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, has noted the same problem. "Plenty of people are calling for public debate on the issue of striking Iran," he told Inter Press Service (IPS) in an interview. "But it isn't happening."

Former Mossad director Meir Dagan launched the first attack on Netanyahu's policy by a former national security official last June, asserting that an attack on Iran would provoke a regional war and would ensure that Iran would acquire nuclear weapons. (See When Meir Dagan speaks ..., Asia Times Online, Mar 13, 2012)

Major General Shlomo Gazit, who was chief of military intelligence in the 1970s, also disassociated himself with the policy, declaring, "An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear reactor will lead to the liquidation of Israel."

Like Dagan, Gazit warned that it would cause Iran to immediately decide to become a nuclear power and he added that it would increase international pressures for the abandonment of "the territories".

Those shots across Netanyahu's bow have not been followed, however, by similar criticisms by other former military and intelligence figures.

In fact, Gazit himself appeared to backtrack from his earlier harsh verdict on the option of attacking Iran in a recent television interview.

On Russia Today on March 12, Gazit did not voice any of his previous objections to the threatened Israeli strike against Iran. Instead he emphasized the readiness of Israel to carry out a strike, even without US approval if necessary, played down the cost to Israel of an Iranian response, and said an Israeli strike would result in delaying the Iranian nuclear program by "two or three years at least".

Gazit reaffirmed to IPS, however, that he had not changed his mind about the dangers to Israel attending a strike against Iran he had raised last June.

The publicly discussed reason for the absence of dissent from the national security sector is lack of information. Nathan Sharony, who heads the Council of Peace, with over 1,000 former high-ranking security officials with dovish views, told Derfner the reason ex-national security officials were not speaking up was that they lack the "solid information" necessary to do so.

Gazit gave IPS the same explanation for the failure of former officials to oppose a strike against Iran publicly.

But the main reasons for opposing war with Iran do not require access to inside information. The more compelling explanation for the silence of former military and intelligence officers is that they, like journalists and other policy analysts, think that Netanyahu is probably bluffing and that they perceive the bluff as working.

Retired Brigadier General Uzi Rubin, the former head of Israel's missile defense program, recalls being on a television program a few months ago with Ari Shavit, senior correspondent at Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, on which Shavit declared, "Netanyahu is playing poker for all of us. We shouldn't call out his cards."

Shavit was suggesting that the success of the prime minister in the high-stakes poker game requires that influential Israelis not question his claims about Israel's willingness and capability to attack Iran's nuclear sites.

That struck a Rubin as a significant factor in the politics surrounding Netanyahu's policy. "People who think we shouldn't attack Iran believe Netanyahu is playing poker," said Rubin in an interview with IPS. "So they think they shouldn't speak up."

"Netanyahu speaks like he's very convinced Iran has to be stopped by force," said the former missile defense chief. "Does he mean it?" Rubin said he doesn't know the answer.

Alpher agrees. He told IPS the reason high-profile expressions of dissent by Dagan and a few others have not provoked more lively debate on Iran policy among national security figures is that "they don't want to spoil Bibi's successful bluster".

Netanyahu's bluffing on Iran has "kept the international community on edge", Alpher suggested, and thus achieved the latest round of sanctions and heavier pressure on Iran.

Both the poker game metaphor and the view that he has been successful at it have been central elements in media coverage of Netanyahu's policy in recent weeks.

While the prime minister was in Washington last month, Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief of Ha'aretz, wrote that Netanyahu had "managed to convince the world that Israel is on the verge of a preemptive war" and that he is "playing poker and hiding his most important card - the Israel Defense Forces's true capabilities to destroy Iran's nuclear installations".

Just last week, Benn's colleague, Ari Shavit, referred to threats to attack Iran's nuclear facilities before the end of 2012 that he and a handful of other journalists had heard from senior officials. Shavit acknowledged, however, that "we cannot exclude the possibility that senior Israeli officials briefing us are bluffing", noting that the officials had a "vested interest" in exploiting such a threat.

One factor that may have fed the reluctance of some former military and intelligence officials to go public with criticism of the option of war against Iran is that Netanyahu has a reputation for being far less aggressive on Iran in practice than his rhetoric would indicate.

Benn told IPS there is a perception of Netanyahu as a "hesitant politician who would not dare to attack without American permission".

A former national security official, who did not wish to be identified, told IPS some people who have worked with Netanyahu have said he is less decisive than former prime minister Ehud Olmert on Iran, although he personally disagrees with that assessment.

The widespread impression among the Israeli national security elite and press corps that Netanyahu's threat of war against Iran is a bluff does not guarantee that Netanyahu will not attack Iran. But it does help explain why there has not been a much bigger outcry against a war option that is widely regarded as irrational for Israel.

.

Nobody going to attack Iran .. west between a rock and hard place

Unwise policy would be to try to slow down Iran .. thinking hardship will bend Iranians

but

Wise approach would be join Iran in shaping that space


.

[Ibrahim]

It may be a bluff, but I don't understand how it is "highly successful." Iran is beetling away with their nuclear program, and the rest of the world (minus America) views Israel as a bellicose lavender-disturber. There are sanctions in place, but that's nothing new to Iran, and I'm sure friends in Russia and China are already using work-arounds for that. It also raised the price of oil a little, which hurts everyone.

I understand why American fundies awaiting Armageddon love Netanyahu, but why anyone else does escapes me.

[monster_gardener]

.

Told you guys all this BullShit


The reason for this silence on the part of the national security sector, just as the Israeli threat of war was escalating sharply, appears to be a widespread view among Israeli national security analysts that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's threat to attack is a highly successful bluff.


All this garbage just to squeeze you guys our of more dough, free this free that, Rhubarb's usual game

.
Some critics of Netanyahu's threat to go war against Iran have expressed concern about the failure of national security figures to speak out publicly against the policy. Former Jerusalem Post columnist Larry Derfner, who now blogs for the independent web-based magazine 972, wrote last month that there are "crowds" of former military and intelligence officials who privately oppose an attack on Iran and who could slow the "march to war" by speaking to the news media.

But he complained that "Israelis aren't hearing their voices".

Yossi Alpher, a former Mossad analyst and later head of the Jaffee Center for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, has noted the same problem. "Plenty of people are calling for public debate on the issue of striking Iran," he told Inter Press Service (IPS) in an interview. "But it isn't happening."

Former Mossad director Meir Dagan launched the first attack on Netanyahu's policy by a former national security official last June, asserting that an attack on Iran would provoke a regional war and would ensure that Iran would acquire nuclear weapons. (See When Meir Dagan speaks ..., Asia Times Online, Mar 13, 2012)

Major General Shlomo Gazit, who was chief of military intelligence in the 1970s, also disassociated himself with the policy, declaring, "An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear reactor will lead to the liquidation of Israel."

Like Dagan, Gazit warned that it would cause Iran to immediately decide to become a nuclear power and he added that it would increase international pressures for the abandonment of "the territories".

Those shots across Netanyahu's bow have not been followed, however, by similar criticisms by other former military and intelligence figures.

In fact, Gazit himself appeared to backtrack from his earlier harsh verdict on the option of attacking Iran in a recent television interview.

On Russia Today on March 12, Gazit did not voice any of his previous objections to the threatened Israeli strike against Iran. Instead he emphasized the readiness of Israel to carry out a strike, even without US approval if necessary, played down the cost to Israel of an Iranian response, and said an Israeli strike would result in delaying the Iranian nuclear program by "two or three years at least".

Gazit reaffirmed to IPS, however, that he had not changed his mind about the dangers to Israel attending a strike against Iran he had raised last June.

The publicly discussed reason for the absence of dissent from the national security sector is lack of information. Nathan Sharony, who heads the Council of Peace, with over 1,000 former high-ranking security officials with dovish views, told Derfner the reason ex-national security officials were not speaking up was that they lack the "solid information" necessary to do so.

Gazit gave IPS the same explanation for the failure of former officials to oppose a strike against Iran publicly.

But the main reasons for opposing war with Iran do not require access to inside information. The more compelling explanation for the silence of former military and intelligence officers is that they, like journalists and other policy analysts, think that Netanyahu is probably bluffing and that they perceive the bluff as working.

Retired Brigadier General Uzi Rubin, the former head of Israel's missile defense program, recalls being on a television program a few months ago with Ari Shavit, senior correspondent at Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, on which Shavit declared, "Netanyahu is playing poker for all of us. We shouldn't call out his cards."

Shavit was suggesting that the success of the prime minister in the high-stakes poker game requires that influential Israelis not question his claims about Israel's willingness and capability to attack Iran's nuclear sites.

That struck a Rubin as a significant factor in the politics surrounding Netanyahu's policy. "People who think we shouldn't attack Iran believe Netanyahu is playing poker," said Rubin in an interview with IPS. "So they think they shouldn't speak up."

"Netanyahu speaks like he's very convinced Iran has to be stopped by force," said the former missile defense chief. "Does he mean it?" Rubin said he doesn't know the answer.

Alpher agrees. He told IPS the reason high-profile expressions of dissent by Dagan and a few others have not provoked more lively debate on Iran policy among national security figures is that "they don't want to spoil Bibi's successful bluster".

Netanyahu's bluffing on Iran has "kept the international community on edge", Alpher suggested, and thus achieved the latest round of sanctions and heavier pressure on Iran.

Both the poker game metaphor and the view that he has been successful at it have been central elements in media coverage of Netanyahu's policy in recent weeks.

While the prime minister was in Washington last month, Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief of Ha'aretz, wrote that Netanyahu had "managed to convince the world that Israel is on the verge of a preemptive war" and that he is "playing poker and hiding his most important card - the Israel Defense Forces's true capabilities to destroy Iran's nuclear installations".

Just last week, Benn's colleague, Ari Shavit, referred to threats to attack Iran's nuclear facilities before the end of 2012 that he and a handful of other journalists had heard from senior officials. Shavit acknowledged, however, that "we cannot exclude the possibility that senior Israeli officials briefing us are bluffing", noting that the officials had a "vested interest" in exploiting such a threat.

One factor that may have fed the reluctance of some former military and intelligence officials to go public with criticism of the option of war against Iran is that Netanyahu has a reputation for being far less aggressive on Iran in practice than his rhetoric would indicate.

Benn told IPS there is a perception of Netanyahu as a "hesitant politician who would not dare to attack without American permission".

A former national security official, who did not wish to be identified, told IPS some people who have worked with Netanyahu have said he is less decisive than former prime minister Ehud Olmert on Iran, although he personally disagrees with that assessment.

The widespread impression among the Israeli national security elite and press corps that Netanyahu's threat of war against Iran is a bluff does not guarantee that Netanyahu will not attack Iran. But it does help explain why there has not been a much bigger outcry against a war option that is widely regarded as irrational for Israel.

.

Nobody going to attack Iran .. west between a rock and hard place

Unwise policy would be to try to slow down Iran .. thinking hardship will bend Iranians

but

Wise approach would be join Iran in shaping that space


.

Thank you Very Much for your Post, Azari.

Major General Shlomo Gazit, who was chief of military intelligence in the 1970s, also disassociated himself with the policy, declaring, "An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear reactor will lead to the liquidation of Israel."

I agree. Followed by the liquidation of Iran........ maybe much of Northern Hemisphere.

Nobody going to attack Iran ..

Hope you are right...........

World between a Space rock and hard place

Corrected

Wise approach would be join Iran in shaping that space

Wise approach would be join Iran, Israel, US, Japan, China, Russia, Germany, Britain, France etc. in shaping Outer Space into Habitats for Humanity

[monster_gardener]

It may be a bluff, but I don't understand how it is "highly successful." Iran is beetling away with their nuclear program, and the rest of the world (minus America) views Israel as a bellicose lavender-disturber. There are sanctions in place, but that's nothing new to Iran, and I'm sure friends in Russia and China are already using work-arounds for that. It also raised the price of oil a little, which hurts everyone.

I understand why American fundies awaiting Armageddon love Netanyahu, but why anyone else does escapes me.

Thank you Very Much for your post, Ibrahim.

The rest of the world (minus America) views Israel as a bellicose lavender-disturber.

Maybe........ Suspect KSA and the Gulf States view Iran as an even worse bellicose lavender-disturber.

Maybe Turkey too but you are better informed........... Azari sees Turkey and Iran as competitors.....

It also raised the price of oil a little, which hurts everyone.

Helps Russia and other exporters of oil...........

[AzariLoveIran]

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Seems FBI & Homeland security saying :

Mossad agents in America recruiting American Muslims for terrorist acts in America


VHuiMO4juKY



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[AzariLoveIran]

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"I will not remain silent because I am weary of the West's hypocrisy," wrote Grass, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1999 for novels such as "The Tin Drum" . .

.
"Grass is the prototype of the educated anti-Semite who means well with the Jews. He is hounded by guilt and feelings of shame and at the same time is driven by the wish to weigh up history," the newspaper wrote on Wednesday. Grass is for many the voice of a German generation that came of age during Adolf Hitler's war and bore the burden of their parents' guilt.
.

.. poor Angela , poor Angela



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[AzariLoveIran]

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Israel's New Strategic Environment
By George Friedman - April 3, 2012

Israel is now entering its third strategic environment. The constant threat of state-on-state war defined the first, which lasted from the founding of the Jewish state until its peace treaty with Egypt. A secure periphery defined the second, which lasted until recently and focused on the Palestinian issue, Lebanon and the rise of radical Sunni Islamists. The rise of Iran as a regional power and the need to build international coalitions to contain it define the third.

Israel's fundamental strategic problem is that its national security interests outstrip its national resources, whether industrial, geographic, demographic or economic. During the first phase, it was highly dependent on outside powers -- first the Soviet Union, then France and finally the United States -- in whose interest it was to provide material support to Israel. In the second phase, the threat lessened, leaving Israel relatively free to define its major issues, such as containing the Palestinians and attempting to pacify Lebanon. Its dependence on outside powers decreased, meaning it could disregard those powers from time to time. In the third phase, Israel's dependence on outside powers, particularly the United States, began increasing. With this increase, Israel's freedom for maneuver began declining.

Containing the Palestinians by Managing its Neighbors

The Palestinian issue, of course, has existed since Israel's founding. By itself, this issue does not pose an existential threat to Israel, since the Palestinians cannot threaten the Israeli state's survival. The Palestinians have had the ability to impose a significant cost on the occupation of the West Bank and the containing of the Gaza Strip, however. They have forced the Israelis to control significant hostile populations with costly, ongoing operations and to pay political costs to countries Israel needs to manage its periphery and global interests. The split between Hamas and Fatah reduced the overall threat but raised the political costs. This became apparent during the winter of 2008-2009 during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza when Hamas, for its own reasons, chose to foment conflict with Israel. Israel's response to Hamas' actions cost the Jewish state support in Europe, Turkey and other places.

Ideological or religious considerations aside, the occupation of the territories makes strategic sense in that if Israel withdraws, Hamas might become militarized to the point of threatening Israel with direct attack or artillery and rocket fire. Israel thus sees itself forced into an occupation that carries significant political costs in order to deal with a theoretical military threat. The threat is presently just theoretical, however, because of Israel's management of its strategic relations with its neighboring nation-states.

Israel has based its management of its regional problem less on creating a balance of power in the region than on taking advantage of tensions among its neighbors to prevent them from creating a united military front against Israel. From 1948 until the 1970s, Lebanon refrained from engaging Israel. Meanwhile, Jordan's Hashemite regime had deep-seated tensions with the Palestinians, with Syria and with Nasserite Egypt. In spite of Israeli-Jordanian conflict in 1967, Jordan saw Israel as a guarantor of its national security. Following the 1973 war, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel that created a buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula.

By then, Lebanon had begun to shift its position, less because of any formal government policy and more because of the disintegration of the Lebanese state and the emergence of a Palestine Liberation Organization presence in southern Lebanon. Currently, with Syria in chaos, Jordan dependent on Israel and Egypt still maintaining the treaty with Israel despite recent Islamist political gains, only Lebanon poses a threat, and that threat is minor.

The Palestinians therefore lack the political or military support to challenge Israel. This in turn has meant that other countries' alienation over Israeli policy toward the Palestinians has carried little risk. European countries opposed to Israeli policy are unlikely to take significant action. Because political opposition cannot translate into meaningful action, Israel can afford a higher level of aggressiveness toward the Palestinians.

Thus, Israel's strongest interest is in maintaining divisions among its neighbors and maintaining their disinterest in engaging Israel. In different ways, unrest in Egypt and Syria and Iran's regional emergence pose a serious challenge to this strategy.

Egypt

Egypt is the ultimate threat to Israel. It has a huge population and, as it demonstrated in 1973, it is capable of mounting complex military operations.

But to do what it did in 1973, Egypt needed an outside power with an interest in supplying Egypt with massive weaponry and other support. In 1973, that power was the Soviet Union, but the Egyptians reversed their alliance position to the U.S. camp following that war. Once their primary source of weaponry became the United States, using that weaponry depended heavily on U.S. supplies of spare parts and contractors.

At this point, no foreign power would be capable of, or interested in, supporting the Egyptian military should Cairo experience regime change and a break with the United States. And a breach of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty alone would not generate a threat to Israel. The United States would act as a brake on Egyptian military capabilities, and no new source would step in. Even if a new source did emerge, it would take a generation for the Egyptians to become militarily effective using new weapon systems. In the long run, however, Egypt will remain Israel's problem.

Syria

The near-term question is Syria's future. Israel had maintained a complex and not always transparent relationship with the Syrian government. In spite of formal hostilities, the two shared common interests in Lebanon. Israel did not want to manage Lebanon after Israeli failures in the 1980s, but it still wanted Lebanon -- and particularly Hezbollah -- managed. Syria wanted to control Lebanon for political and economic reasons and did not want Israel interfering there. An implicit accommodation was thus possible, one that didn't begin to unravel until the United States forced Syria out of Lebanon, freeing Hezbollah from Syrian controls and setting the stage for the 2006 war.

Israel continued to view the Alawite regime in Syria as preferable to a radical Sunni regime. In the context of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the threat to Israel came from radical Sunni Islamists; Israel's interests lay with whoever opposed them. Today, with the United States out of Iraq and Iran a dominant influence there, the Israelis face a more complex choice. If the regime of President Bashar al Assad survives (with or without al Assad himself), Iran -- which is supplying weapons and advisers to Syria -- will wield much greater influence in Syria. In effect, this would create an Iranian sphere of influence running from western Afghanistan to Iraq, Syria and into Lebanon via Hezbollah. It would create a regional power. And an Iranian regional power would pose severe dangers to Israel.

Accordingly, Israel has shifted its thinking from supporting the al Assad regime to wanting it to depart so that a Sunni government hostile to Iran but not dominated by radical Islamists could emerge. Here we reach the limits of Israeli power, because what happens in Syria is beyond Israel's control. Those who might influence the course of events in Syria apart from Iran include Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Both are being extremely cautious in their actions, however, and neither government is excessively sensitive to U.S. needs. Israel's main ally, the United States, has little influence in Syria, particularly given Russian and, to some extent, Chinese opposition to American efforts to shape Syria's future.

Even more than Egypt, Syria is a present threat to Israel, not by itself but because it could bring a more distant power -- Iran -- to bear. As important, Syria could threaten the stability of the region by reshaping the politics of Lebanon or destabilizing Jordan. The only positive dimension for Israel is that Iran's military probably will not be able to deploy significant forces far from its borders for many years. Iran simply lacks the logistical or command capabilities for such an operation. But developing them is just a matter of time. Israel could, of course, launch a war in Syria. But the challenge of occupying Syria would dwarf the challenge Israel faces with the Palestinians. On the other side of the equation, an Iranian presence in Syria could reshape the West Bank in spite of Shiite-Sunni tensions.

The United States and the Europeans, with Libya as a model, theoretically could step into managing Syria. But Libya was a seven-month war in a much less populous country. It is unlikely they would attempt this in Syria, and if they did, it would not be because Israel needed them to do so. And this points to Israel's core strategic weakness. In dealing with Syria and the emergent Iranian influence there, Israel is incapable of managing the situation by itself. It must have outside powers intervening on its behalf. And that intervention poses military and political challenges that Israel's patron, the United States, doesn't want to undertake.

It is important to understand that Israel, after a long period in which it was able to manage its national security issues, is now re-entering the phase where it cannot do so without outside support. This is where its policy on the Palestinians begins to hurt, particularly in Europe, where intervention on behalf of Israeli interests would conflict with domestic European political forces. In the United States, where the Israeli-Palestinian problem has less impact, the appetite to intervene in yet another Muslim country is simply not there, particularly without European allies.

Iran

This is all compounded by the question of Iranian nuclear weapons. In our view, as we have said, the Iranians are far closer to a controlled underground test than to a deliverable weapon. Israel's problem is that Iran appears on the verge of a strategic realignment in the region. The sense that Iran is an emerging nuclear power both enhances Iran's position and decreases anyone's appetite to do anything about it. Israel is practicing psychological warfare against Iran, but it still faces a serious problem: The more Iran consolidates its position in the Middle East and the closer it is to a weapon the more other countries outside the region will have to accommodate themselves to Iran. And this leaves Israel vulnerable.

Israel cannot do much about Syria, but a successful attack on Iranian nuclear facilities could undermine Iranian credibility at a time when Israel badly needs to do just that. Here again, Israel faces its strategic problem. It might be able to carry out an effective strike against Iran, particularly if, as has been speculated, a country such as Azerbaijan provides facilities like airfields. However, even with such assistance, Israel's air force is relatively small, meaning there is no certainty of success. Nor could Israel strike without American knowledge and approval. The Americans will know about an Israeli strike by technical intelligence. Hiding such a strike from either the Americans or Russians would be difficult, compounding the danger to Israel.

More important, Israel cannot strike Iran without U.S. permission because Israel cannot guarantee that the Iranians would not mine the Strait of Hormuz. Only the United States could hope to stop the Iranians from doing so, and the United States would need to initiate the conflict by taking out the Iranian mine-laying capability before the first Israeli strike. Given its dependence on the United States for managing its national security, the decision to attack would have to be taken jointly. An uncoordinated attack by Israel would be possible only if Israel were willing to be the cause of global economic chaos.

Israel's strategic problem is that it must align its strategy with the United States and with anyone the United States regards as essential to its national security, such as the Saudis. But the United States has interests beyond Israel, so Israel is constantly entangled with its patron's multiplicity of interests. This limits its range of action as severely as its air force's constraints do.

Since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli dependence on outsiders was limited. Israel could act on issues like settlements, for example, regardless of American views. That period is coming to an end, and with it the period in which Israel could afford to deviate from its patron. People frequently discuss any U.S.-Israeli rift in terms of personal relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but this is mistaken. It is uncertainty in Egypt and Syria and the emergence of Iran that have created a new strategic reality for Israel.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/israels- ... f31d40055b

.

Typical Zionist thinking and mindset

In the whole article, not a single word what the indigini thinking or what is wrong or right

talk is only how to play this against that and kill there and there

no talk about whether this will lead anywhere

Reminds me of that Rabbi "the bride is beautiful but already married" message sent home to Herzl


.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

Never in the history of postwar Germany has a prominent intellectual attacked Israel in such a cliche-laden way as Günter Grass with his new poem, "What Must Be Said." . . . The Nobel Prize laureate has delivered a lyrical first strike against Israel.

.
Das Gedicht von Günter Grass

Günter Grass warnt in der "Süddeutschen Zeitung" vor einem Krieg gegen Iran. In seinem Gedicht mit dem Titel "Was gesagt werden muss" fordert der Literaturnobelpreisträger deshalb, Israel dürfe keine deutschen U-Boote mehr bekommen.
.

.

Was gesagt werden muss

Gedicht zum Konflikt zwischen Israel und Iran

Warum schweige ich, verschweige zu lange,
was offensichtlich ist und in Planspielen
geübt wurde, an deren Ende als Überlebende
wir allenfalls Fußnoten sind.

Es ist das behauptete Recht auf den Erstschlag,
der das von einem Maulhelden unterjochte
und zum organisierten Jubel gelenkte
iranische Volk auslöschen könnte,
weil in dessen Machtbereich der Bau
einer Atombombe vermutet wird.

Doch warum untersage ich mir,
jenes andere Land beim Namen zu nennen,
in dem seit Jahren - wenn auch geheimgehalten -
ein wachsend nukleares Potential verfügbar
aber außer Kontrolle, weil keiner Prüfung
zugänglich ist?

Das allgemeine Verschweigen dieses Tatbestandes,
dem sich mein Schweigen untergeordnet hat,
empfinde ich als belastende Lüge
und Zwang, der Strafe in Aussicht stellt,
sobald er mißachtet wird;
das Verdikt "Antisemitismus" ist geläufig.

Jetzt aber, weil aus meinem Land,
das von ureigenen Verbrechen,
die ohne Vergleich sind,
Mal um Mal eingeholt und zur Rede gestellt wird,
wiederum und rein geschäftsmäßig, wenn auch
mit flinker Lippe als Wiedergutmachung deklariert,
ein weiteres U-Boot nach Israel
geliefert werden soll, dessen Spezialität
darin besteht, allesvernichtende Sprengköpfe
dorthin lenken zu können, wo die Existenz
einer einzigen Atombombe unbewiesen ist,
doch als Befürchtung von Beweiskraft sein will,
sage ich, was gesagt werden muß.

Warum aber schwieg ich bislang?
Weil ich meinte, meine Herkunft,
die von nie zu tilgendem Makel behaftet ist,
verbiete, diese Tatsache als ausgesprochene Wahrheit
dem Land Israel, dem ich verbunden bin
und bleiben will, zuzumuten.

Warum sage ich jetzt erst,
gealtert und mit letzter Tinte:
Die Atommacht Israel gefährdet
den ohnehin brüchigen Weltfrieden?
Weil gesagt werden muß,
was schon morgen zu spät sein könnte;
auch weil wir - als Deutsche belastet genug -
Zulieferer eines Verbrechens werden könnten,
das voraussehbar ist, weshalb unsere Mitschuld
durch keine der üblichen Ausreden
zu tilgen wäre.

Und zugegeben: ich schweige nicht mehr,
weil ich der Heuchelei des Westens
überdrüssig bin; zudem ist zu hoffen,
es mögen sich viele vom Schweigen befreien,
den Verursacher der erkennbaren Gefahr
zum Verzicht auf Gewalt auffordern und
gleichfalls darauf bestehen,
daß eine unbehinderte und permanente Kontrolle
des israelischen atomaren Potentials
und der iranischen Atomanlagen
durch eine internationale Instanz
von den Regierungen beider Länder zugelassen wird.

Nur so ist allen, den Israelis und Palästinensern,
mehr noch, allen Menschen, die in dieser
vom Wahn okkupierten Region
dicht bei dicht verfeindet leben
und letztlich auch uns zu helfen.

.

Dreimal hoch Günter, Bravo

Let's see what that shithead (Elie Wiesel) will say

Things unraveling


.

[Ibrahim]

Hope Gunter Grass likes being called a "Nazi" for the rest of his life by the Spenglernetas of the world.

[monster_gardener]

.

Never in the history of postwar Germany has a prominent intellectual attacked Israel in such a cliche-laden way as Günter Grass with his new poem, "What Must Be Said." . . . The Nobel Prize laureate has delivered a lyrical first strike against Israel.

.
Das Gedicht von Günter Grass

Günter Grass warnt in der "Süddeutschen Zeitung" vor einem Krieg gegen Iran. In seinem Gedicht mit dem Titel "Was gesagt werden muss" fordert der Literaturnobelpreisträger deshalb, Israel dürfe keine deutschen U-Boote mehr bekommen.
.

.

Was gesagt werden muss

Gedicht zum Konflikt zwischen Israel und Iran

Warum schweige ich, verschweige zu lange,
was offensichtlich ist und in Planspielen
geübt wurde, an deren Ende als Überlebende
wir allenfalls Fußnoten sind.

Es ist das behauptete Recht auf den Erstschlag,
der das von einem Maulhelden unterjochte
und zum organisierten Jubel gelenkte
iranische Volk auslöschen könnte,
weil in dessen Machtbereich der Bau
einer Atombombe vermutet wird.

Doch warum untersage ich mir,
jenes andere Land beim Namen zu nennen,
in dem seit Jahren - wenn auch geheimgehalten -
ein wachsend nukleares Potential verfügbar
aber außer Kontrolle, weil keiner Prüfung
zugänglich ist?

Das allgemeine Verschweigen dieses Tatbestandes,
dem sich mein Schweigen untergeordnet hat,
empfinde ich als belastende Lüge
und Zwang, der Strafe in Aussicht stellt,
sobald er mißachtet wird;
das Verdikt "Antisemitismus" ist geläufig.

Jetzt aber, weil aus meinem Land,
das von ureigenen Verbrechen,
die ohne Vergleich sind,
Mal um Mal eingeholt und zur Rede gestellt wird,
wiederum und rein geschäftsmäßig, wenn auch
mit flinker Lippe als Wiedergutmachung deklariert,
ein weiteres U-Boot nach Israel
geliefert werden soll, dessen Spezialität
darin besteht, allesvernichtende Sprengköpfe
dorthin lenken zu können, wo die Existenz
einer einzigen Atombombe unbewiesen ist,
doch als Befürchtung von Beweiskraft sein will,
sage ich, was gesagt werden muß.

Warum aber schwieg ich bislang?
Weil ich meinte, meine Herkunft,
die von nie zu tilgendem Makel behaftet ist,
verbiete, diese Tatsache als ausgesprochene Wahrheit
dem Land Israel, dem ich verbunden bin
und bleiben will, zuzumuten.

Warum sage ich jetzt erst,
gealtert und mit letzter Tinte:
Die Atommacht Israel gefährdet
den ohnehin brüchigen Weltfrieden?
Weil gesagt werden muß,
was schon morgen zu spät sein könnte;
auch weil wir - als Deutsche belastet genug -
Zulieferer eines Verbrechens werden könnten,
das voraussehbar ist, weshalb unsere Mitschuld
durch keine der üblichen Ausreden
zu tilgen wäre.

Und zugegeben: ich schweige nicht mehr,
weil ich der Heuchelei des Westens
überdrüssig bin; zudem ist zu hoffen,
es mögen sich viele vom Schweigen befreien,
den Verursacher der erkennbaren Gefahr
zum Verzicht auf Gewalt auffordern und
gleichfalls darauf bestehen,
daß eine unbehinderte und permanente Kontrolle
des israelischen atomaren Potentials
und der iranischen Atomanlagen
durch eine internationale Instanz
von den Regierungen beider Länder zugelassen wird.

Nur so ist allen, den Israelis und Palästinensern,
mehr noch, allen Menschen, die in dieser
vom Wahn okkupierten Region
dicht bei dicht verfeindet leben
und letztlich auch uns zu helfen.

.

Dreimal hoch Günter, Bravo

Let's see what that shithead (Elie Wiesel) will say

Things unraveling


.

Thank you Very Much for your post, Azari.

For those who can't read German or don't want to, below is a Google Translation....*

As they say
One bad cliche
Deserves another
Or several....

Gunter GrAss:-) Sheisskopfs und AyaToilets & Space Rocks....

Let's see what that shithead (Elie Wiesel) will say

Elie Wiesel is not above criticism.... Recall reading a criticism of him in Haaretz....

But if Eli ist ein Scheisskopf/Shithead ...... so are the AyaToilets of Iran including "Great/Little Satan" Khomenei and Master of the Jew Killing Talking Trees Trash Talking Rain of Fire Khamanei..... who may just get both Iran and Israel burned up..........

Günter Grass, warns in the "Sueddeutsche Zeitung" of a war against Iran. In his poem titled "What must be said" the Nobel literature requests, therefore, Israel should not get a German U-boats more.



Why I am silent, silent about too long,
what is obvious and in simulations
was practiced, as at the end of survivor
We are footnotes at best.

It is alleged that on the first strike,
of the subjugated by bullies
organized and directed rejoicing
could wipe out people of Iran,
because in the sphere of construction
a bomb is suspected.

But why do I say to myself,
that other country to call by name,
In the years since - though secret -
a growing nuclear capabilities available
but out of control, because no test
accessible?

The general concealment of this fact,
which my silence has subordinated
I feel as burdensome lie
and is forced, the penalty in view,
when it is ignored;
the verdict of "antisemitism" is familiar.

But now, because in my country,
from the very own crime
who are without comparison,
Time to time will be sought and taken to task,
turn and purely commercial basis, albeit
with nimble lip declared as restitution,
another U-boat to Israel
be delivered to the specialty
in it, everything is devastating warheads
there may be direct, where the existence
a single atomic bomb is unproven,
wants to be but as a fear of evidentiary value,
I say what needs to be said.

But why I kept quiet until now?
As I said, my background,
which is never subject to tilgendem flaw
forbid this as a fact distinct truth
the land of Israel, whom I am connected
and wants to stay, be expected.

Why do I say now only
aged and last ink:
The nuclear-armed Israel at risk
the already fragile world peace?
Because it must be said
what tomorrow might be too late;
also because we - as a German loaded enough -
Suppliers could be a crime
that is predictable, which is why our complicity
none of the usual excuses
would pay off.

And yes, I hold not more,
because I was the hypocrisy of the West
'm tired, also is to be hoped
There may be many free of silence
the cause of the apparent danger
to renounce violence and call on
also insist
that unrestricted and permanent control
of Israel's nuclear potential
and the Iranian nuclear facilities
by an international body
is approved by the governments of both countries.

Only then is all, the Israelis and Palestinians
more, all people working in this
region occupied by the delusion
live close to enemies close
and ultimately to help us.

insist
that unrestricted and permanent control
of Israel's nuclear potential
and the Iranian nuclear facilities
by an international body
is approved by the governments of both countries.

Good idea but needs work......... **

Suggest a joint Iranian-Israel Anti-Meteor Space Agency under the auspices of the UN using nuke powered Orion Rockets..........

The rest of US/the World better get our space butts in gear if that happens............

The power to save can become the power to tyrannize............

But if we don't try, we are dumber than the space rocks that will kill us...........

*I can do German if I work at it..... but I think that Heinlein may have been right that German is a language so ugly that German poems are sometimes better in translation........ Maybe not this time.......... With Google Translate.......

Not that German isn't good for somethings... Compound words for example: Recalling the word for a gin cocktail.......

Wacholderbeerbranntweinhahnenschwanz ......... or just use the English loan word: "Gin Cocktail

** And security guarantees but IIRC correctly, the UN has a laughable record of peace keeping unless both/all sides really want peace.... Remembering Nasser....

[AzariLoveIran]

.

Look, folks

Significance of that Poem in New York Times, New York the epicenter of Zionism evil

is not

Günter Grass a literature Nobel Price winner

significance is

Günter Grass representing German (silent majority) "soul"

Now

stay tuned

others

will jump into that debate


You, Elie, go first : "The Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity"


mfMv1KWT2bU


Zionist to the bone


Head of "Foundation for Humanity" ? ?


Rather, special agent for "Holocaust Industry"


and

Haaretz : .. What he said has been said by many others, both in and out of Israel.

.
Few could dispute that the world will be a better place without an Iranian nuclear weapon. And not only in Israel - also the northern German town of Lubeck, the capital of marzipan, where Grass writes, paints and sculpts, will be a better place if Iran doesn't get the bomb. Grass basks in hypocritical moralism and agonizes over not having condemned Israel's nuclear capacity earlier. But that award went many years ago to Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli nuclear technician who revealed details about his country's nuclear program to the press in 1986.

[..]

He was right to assume that after his anti-Israeli comments he will be accused of anti-Semitism. Grass, it seems, feels compelled to address unwarranted accusations. Either way, you can relax, Mr. Grass. You've written a rather pathetic poem, but you're not anti-Semitic. You're not even anti-Israel; in any event, not more than Dagan is. You said you wrote that poem with your last drops of ink. Let's hope you have enough for another beautiful novel.
.

In a statement on Wednesday, the Israeli Embassy in Berlin pointed out that the poem was published just before the feast of Passover.

.
Wolffsohn: I noticed that too. In doing so, Grass is following an ignoble tradition. The time around Passover has always been the time of pogroms and a time when the blood libel myth about Jews is disseminated.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Grass accuses Israel of claiming a "right to the first strike" which "could wipe out the Iranian people." Do you really think that he is following an anti-Semitic tradition with such statements?

Wolffsohn: At the very least, I would not have expected such cluelessness from a former practicing Catholic like Grass, given the current tension between different religions. Apart from anything else, this talk of a "first strike" is total nonsense.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why?

Wolffsohn: Israel has never threatened to conduct a nuclear first strike. The submarines which are referred to in the poem provide a second-strike capability. If one's own territory has been devastated by a nuclear attack, submarines give a nation the ability to respond to the attack. That's something which is obvious to anyone who knows anything about military strategy. Grass clearly has no idea about the topic.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: But Grass also calls Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a "loudmouth" who has "subjugated" his people.

Wolffsohn: That doesn't make things any better. By using the word "loudmouth," he is trivializing the nuclearization of Iran. The Jews have learned from history that threats are more than just crazy talk -- thanks to Hitler, who Grass fought for.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: You are referring to the fact that Grass was recruited into the Waffen-SS as a teenager toward the end of World War II. It was against his will, as he explains in his autobiography "Peeling the Onion."

Wolffsohn: At it happens, I have just read the book, and was shocked by how he played it down. At the age of 17, one certainly does possess a political consciousness. Grass is simply not capable of self-criticism. Apart from that, he himself also writes in his "Onion" book that he had volunteered for the Navy and would have also been happy to join a tank regiment. Not his parents, however.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you believe him when he writes in his poem that he feels "connected" to the State of Israel?

Wolffsohn: I have never believed him. He was never a friend of the Jewish people -- this is a myth he constructed himself. During his very first visit to Israel on the occasion of the first German-Israeli "culture week" in 1971, he already acted like a bull in a china shop, and lectured the Israeli audience on historical and moral issues.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Grass writes that he was condemned to silence, because otherwise he would be accused of anti-Semitism.

Wolffsohn: This is a very common stance in Germany: According to a poll by the Allensbach Institute, 52 percent of Germans believe that, when it comes to the issue of Israel and Jews, it is too easy to fall flat on your face. I am very cautious about using the term (anti-Semitic), but what Grass has written is an anti-Semitic pamphlet compressed into pseudo-poetry. Moreover, the possibility of an Iranian attack on Israel is the subject of extensive public debate, as is the question of a conventional bombing of Iran by Israel. Grass is living in a dream world if he believes that there is some kind of taboo in that respect. It's yet another indication that the man engages entirely in navel-gazing.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Grass is 84 years old. Can one argue in his defense that maybe he is getting a bit too opinionated or even confused in his old age?

Wolffsohn: No. I know the complete works of Grass -- he is really formidable in terms of language. And this undeniable eloquence is, in his case, fundamentally shaped by a moral and intellectual brutality. He appoints himself as judge and jury. The man is the sum of all his prejudices. Quite apart from that, there are also great works of literature that were written by authors of a similar age -- think of Goethe's later works, for example.
.

Grass accuses Israel of claiming a "right to the first strike" which "could wipe out the Iranian people." Do you really think that he is following an anti-Semitic tradition with such statements?

Wolffsohn: At the very least, I would not have expected such cluelessness from a former practicing Catholic like Grass, given the current tension between different religions. Apart from anything else, this talk of a "first strike" is total nonsense.

Seems, saying anything against Israel dropping a nuclear bomb on Iran, "wiping out Iranian people" , is a anti-semitic sign

.. looooooooooooove it .. a real animal farm



.

[AzariLoveIran]

.


" Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel Is Coming to an End "

.
It's not that he's changed his mind on the conflict, he just says blaming Israel has become too easy.

"Nobody really defends Israel anymore," he said in an interview. "If you go on college campuses, there are some Hillel faithfuls who are bringing an IDF soldier to try to explain that not all IDF soldiers are war criminals. And among the 60 to 100 people in the audience, there are Palestinian supporters who come with tape over their mouth, and when the soldier starts to speak, many people stand up and walk out.

"They've lost the battle for public opinion," he says. "They claim it's because American Jews know too little - I claim it's because they know too much about the conflict, and young liberal Jews have difficulty defending the use of cluster bombs in Lebanon or supporting the Israeli settlements. I was bashing Israel in the past because nobody else was exposing its true record. Many people are doing it now, so I switched hats from a critic of Israel to a diplomat who wants to resolve the conflict. I have not changed, but I think the spectrum has moved."

Finkelstein's book is suprisingly optimistic about the chances of settling the confict, and about changing the debate, even among American Jewry. The tide of public opinion is turning against Israel, he says, and once support for Israeli policy becomes widely unacceptable in the United States, the "self-designated voices for Israel," as he calls them, will quickly drop out. Meanwhile, American Jewish college students are having their eyes opened.

"The academic research on Israel is no longer the footnoted "Exodus," and younger Jews, when they go to college, are walking away with very different picture of Israel," he said. "And the American Jewish community that for a long time was a huge obstacle to resolving the conflict is breaking up. If you put forth a reasonable and principled goal, I think a resolution is possible. We might be entering the endgame, but one that might take a long time."

Loyal to his tradition of combativeness, Finkelstein takes on not only Michael Oren, Jeffrey Goldberg, Benny Morris and others, but also Steven Walt and John Mearsheimer's book on the Israel lobby.

"I accept that the lobby is very influential and shapes [U.S.] policy on Israel-Palestine. But when Walt and Mearsheimer start generalizing about the influence of the lobby on Iraq, Iran policy and elsewhere - that's where I think they get it wrong. I just can't find any evidence for it."

Finkelstein describes the leadership of J Street as "hopeless". "It's simply the loyal opposition. Politically they identify themselves mostly with Kadima."

Yet he recently clashed with those to the left of J Street, attacking the goals of the BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions ) movement.

"I've written a little book on Gandhi, and one of the significant insights of his is that it's important not only for your tactics to be perceived as moral, the public also has to see your goal as moral. And the problem with BDS is the ambiguity of the goal. Their official position is: 'We take no position on [the legitimacy of] Israel.' While BDS is a legitimate tactic to force Israel to accept the two-state solution, it has to have a just goal, which means it has to include recognition of Israel as a state. I received mostly hostile reactions from the BDS activists, and that's OK - I am not out there to please."

more @ link
.

worth reading . .

I'm actually optimistic about Israel issue coming to a close

Israel seeing the limit of military force

The ugly leaders are failing .. wisdom taking over .. the good Israeli will step forward

maybe one more defeat (like Lebanon), and we should be there


.

[AzariLoveIran]

.


A spokesman for Angela MErkel's govenrment Steffen Seibert tried to stay out of the controversy, saying : "There is artistic freedom in Germany and there thankfully also is the freedom of the government not to have to comment on every artistic production."

.

What must be said

Why I am silent, silent for too much time,
how much is clear and we made it
in war games, where, as survivors,
we are just the footnotes.

That is the claimed right to the formal preventive aggression
which could erase the Iranian people
dominated by a bouncer and moved to an organized jubilation,
because in the area of his competence there is
the construction of the atomic bomb.

And then why do I avoid myself
to call the other country with its name,
where since years - even if secretly covered -
there is an increasing nuclear power,
without control, because unreachable
by every inspection?

I feel the everybody silence on this state of affairs,
which my silence is slave to,
as an oppressive lie and an inhibition that presents punishment
we don’t pay attention to;
the verdict “anti-Semitism” is common.

Now, since my country,
from time to time touched by unique and exclusive crimes,
obliged to justify itself,
again for pure business aims - even if
with fast tongue we call it “reparation” -
should deliver another submarine to Israel,
with the specialty of addressing
annihilating warheads where the
existence of one atomic bomb is not proved
but it wants evidence as a scarecrow,
I say what must be said.

Why did I stay silent until now?
Because the thought about my origin,
burdened by an unclearing stain,
had avoiding to wait this fact
like a truth declared by the State of Israel
that I want to be connected to.

Why did I say it only now,
old and with the last ink:
the nuclear power of Israel
threat the world peace?
Because it must be said
what tomorrow will be too late;
Because - as Germans and with
enough faults on the back -
we might also become deliverers of a predictable
crime, and no excuse would erase our complicity.

And I admit: I won’t be silent
because I had enough of the Western hypocrisy;
Because I wish that many will want
to get rid of the silence,
exhorting the cause of a recognizable
risk to the abdication, asking that a free and permanent control
of the Israel atomic power
and the Iran nuclear bases
will be made by both the governments
with an international supervision.

Only in this way, Israelis, Palestinians, and everybody,
all people living hostile face to face in that
country occupied by the craziness,
will have a way out,
so us too.

Translation by Alessandro Ghebreigziabiher



Emmanuel Nahshon, the Israeli ambassador to Berlin, condemned Grass's poem in a statement, saying: "What must be said is that it is a European tradition to accuse the Jews before the Passover festival of ritual murder. Earlier, it was Christian children whose blood the Jews allegedly used to make their unleavened bread, but today it is the Iranian people that the Jewish state allegedly wants to annihilate."

The Central Council of Jews in Germany has expressed deep shock over Grass's poem, describing it as "an aggressive pamphlet of agitation."

German leftist groups, however, expressed their support for Grass's effort. Wolfgang Gehrcke, the deputy leader of the German Left party, lauded the poet's courage for speaking out about the situation when everyone else has remained silent.

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[Parodite]

Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.

.

who is Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting ? ? .. Günter, Angela or Azari ? ?


come on, Rhapsy .. don't you see rats abandoning ship ? ?

Now, pretty much, Europe, solid anti Zionist

Not only Norway but Germany too

Angela says this "artistic freedom"

.. you getting it, Rhapsy ? ?


.

[Ibrahim]

Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.

Right, because he doesn't want to sell Israel submarines that could be used to nuke Iranians or Arabs. What a loser.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

.
Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.
.

Right, because he doesn't want to sell Israel submarines that could be used to nuke Iranians or Arabs. What a loser.

.

A nuclear state (Zionist evil) threatening a non nuclear state (our beloved Iran) with nuclear annihilation

Music to the ears of Ayatollahs .. they vindicted

and

Outrage in Israel, Praise in Iran

.
. . "Günter Grass' shameful moral equivalence between Israel and Iran, a regime that denies the Holocaust and threatens to annihilate Israel, says little about Israel and much about Mr. Grass," a statement released by Netanyahu's office read. "For six decades, Mr. Grass hid the fact that he had been a member of the Waffen-SS. So for him to cast the one and only Jewish state as the greatest threat to world peace and to oppose giving Israel the means to defend itself is perhaps not surprising."

However, Grass did receive praise from one source: Iran. Iranian state broadcaster Press TV reported on Thursday that, "Never in the history of postwar Germany has a prominent intellectual attacked Israel in such a brave way as Günter Grass with his controversial new poem. Metaphorically, the Nobelist has delivered a lethally lyrical strike against Israel."
.

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German TV Interviews Planned

Israeli historian Tom Segev has emerged as one of the strongest critics. In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, he said he has the impression that Grass is driven largely by his decades of silence about his membership in the SS during the final days of World War II.

Grass, who is 84 and lives in the village of Behlendorf near Lübeck, now plans to address the poem in two televised interviews on Thursday night.

On Thursday, Grass did find one defender -- the president of the Berlin-based Academy of Arts, a respected institution that has counted Goethe and Brecht among its past members. "One must be allowed to express clear words without being denounced as an enemy of Israel," President Klaus Staeck told the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung newspaper.

In his poem, Grass said he had been silent for too long. "But I will be silent no more," he wrote.
.

As said, Günter Grass represent German soul .. meaning, what Günter Grass says, is how Germans feel

Said many times, folks

all the world is watching .. and they no idiots

they know who right and who wrong

now

people will speak out

and justly say

Iran the victim

Zionist the "Perpetrator"

that is what Günter Grass saying .. Christal clear


.

[Parodite]

Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.

Right, because he doesn't want to sell Israel submarines that could be used to nuke Iranians or Arabs. What a loser.

Nah. The desire to have his government not sell a nuclear submarine to Israel is the only element in his rant that deserves contemplation, simply because that is the right a country has and can actually decide to do or not to do. The rest is sentimental drivel combined with unrealistic ought.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

.

.
Disconnected brainless sentimental ranting.
.

Right, because he doesn't want to sell Israel submarines that could be used to nuke Iranians or Arabs. What a loser.

.

Nah. The desire to have his government not sell a nuclear submarine to Israel is the only element in his rant that deserves contemplation, simply because that is the right a country has and can actually decide to do or not to do. The rest is sentimental drivel combined with unrealistic ought.

.

Rhapsy

issue not submarine

issue Zionism losing legitimacy, becoming the bad guy

now

Spiegel saying Günter Grass is right

Günter Grass saying Zionst evil and Spiegel seconds it

Europeans were always anti Zionist

but now

things coming out of the closet

Günter Grass got the ball rollin

stay tuned


.

[Parodite]

Günter Grass saying Zionst evil and Spiegel seconds it

Maybe Grass says so, and Spiegel, and and and... Azari. Who cares?

Lipstick and creams. For you they are the issue and reality. It's okay. Iranians are very much into looking good, projecting a desirable image. Nothing to do with reality. So far only Iranian women have any success, though.

[AzariLoveIran]

.

NYT - Storm Continues After German Writer’s Poem Against Israel

.
By supplying weapons to Israel, including submarines, Germany risked being complicit in “a foreseeable crime,” Mr. Grass wrote.

..

“I’m afraid this could be a turning point in the way part of the German public speaks about Israel.”

..

Writing on the popular news Web site Spiegel Online, Jakob Augstein, the publisher of the weekly magazine Der Freitag, said that it was neither a great poem nor brilliant political analysis, but that “one should thank Grass” for starting the debate about the threat Israel poses to peace.

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Maybe Grass says so, and Spiegel, and and and... Azari.

Who cares ?

Lipstick and creams.

For you they are the issue and reality.

It's okay.

Iranians are very much into looking good, projecting a desirable image.

Nothing to do with reality.

.

Rhapsy ,

In this and other fora, I have written that not talking & debating what happened in Hitler time,

what really happened .. why it happened .. who did not help and who actively was involved .. what was head of Zionists leaders role in all that .. and many other question in this regard

not debating it and pretending people from Mars, called Nazi, did all those things .. not only to Jews but to millions of others

not debating this

will not make things OK

I said

Europe

same Europe as those "good old days"

Europe pretty much had it with Zionist .. Zionist are now a net negative for Europe

Grass got the ball rolling now

and

America will not be far behind

stay tuned for an American "Grass" article in NYT

have you recognized there was no outcry from American Jewish leaders ? ?

why they say nothing ? ?

reason is they know Grass is right and they fear now the backlash

they know American RedNeck, Joe, is pissed off .. really pissed off

and

Notion

"who cares"

really silly


.

[AzariLoveIran]

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Israel declares Günter Grass persona non grata

.
FM Lieberman says German author who labeled Israel 'threat to world peace' would be willing to 'sacrifice Jewish nation to sell a few more books.'
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This Khazari Lieberman really nasty

.