First principles on faith

[Dioscuri]

It's really quite simple.

Envision any physical object. You're envisioning its exterior. The thingness of every Thing is constituted by an outside that separates what it is from everything that it is not.

Take something more abstract, like "heat", or "virtue." These are Names that are cognized by degrees of identity with and differentiation from other Names. Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

Even a "pure idea", such as "the Good Itself," is cognized with reference to locating an instance of good "within" the named interior space of the Idea (this explains the essential Platonic metaphor of something's "participation in" an Idea).

The Name provides the dimension of directionality; source, relation, and destination.

Anything existent, conceivable, or expressible can be exhaustively described in terms of the three elementary cognitions. The three cognitions can be described only in terms of themselves. Hence, they are "elementary." They are the First Principles.

[Marcus]

It's really quite simple.

Envision any physical object. You're envisioning its exterior. The thingness of every Thing is constituted by an outside that separates what it is from everything that it is not.

Take something more abstract, like "heat", or "virtue." These are Names that are cognized by degrees of identity with and differentiation from other Names. Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

Even a "pure idea", such as "the Good Itself," is cognized with reference to locating an instance of good "within" the named interior space of the Idea (this explains the essential Platonic metaphor of something's "participation in" an Idea).

The Name provides the dimension of directionality; source, relation, and destination.

Anything existent, conceivable, or expressible can be exhaustively described in terms of the three elementary cognitions. The three cognitions can be described only in terms of themselves. Hence, they are "elementary." They are the First Principles.

Fine and good, but all that doesn't tell us jack-poop about where the things come from or how we perceive the things to which we give names. That Adam named the animals doesn't say squat about where the animals came from.

So, no, the first principles are those "first" things to which we give names. While what you're describing might be some sort of way to define mental categorization, is says nothing at all about what "the good" might indeed be or how different presuppositional "first things" define "the good."

[Dioscuri]

Fine and good, but all that doesn't tell us jack-poop about where the things come from or how we perceive the things to which we give names.

Sure it does. It tells you that things came from a "place" which they were inside of, and that that place was not other places. That's not nothing.

If you're interested in "what" "existed" "before" there were places, then what you're interested in does not belong to this universe. It may "belong" to "some" "universe", but it would "be" one in which different elementary cognitions apply, meaning that we really cannot speak of "it" "existing".

So, no, the first principles are those "first" things to which we give names. While what you're describing might be some sort of way to define mental categorization, is says nothing at all about what "the good" might indeed be or how different presuppositional "first things" define "the good."

The Good is not "a thing" and is not definable, in the sense of establishing a strict delimitation of its semantic range. It's a projective interior space of undefined boundary in which people find it desirable to be.

The best we could do would be to record every named instance of an event which someone elects to describe as "good", as measured against disputing elections ("no, that wasn't good!"), and that would give you a constantly expanding semantic map of what in actuality is "good."

Even that, though doable, would be tricky, insofar as most occurrences of "good" simply beg the question "good for what?", which people rarely want or are able to answer sufficiently because it lets slip the truth, namely, that the Good is a Name.

[Marcus]

Sure it does. It tells you that things came from a "place" which they were inside of, and that that place was not other places. That's not nothing.

If you're interested in "what" "existed" "before" there were places, then what you're interested in does not belong to this universe. It may "belong" to "some" "universe", but it would "be" one in which different elementary cognitions apply, meaning that we really cannot speak of "it" "existing".

So, no, the first principles are those "first" things to which we give names. While what you're describing might be some sort of way to define mental categorization, is says nothing at all about what "the good" might indeed be or how different presuppositional "first things" define "the good."

The Good is not "a thing" and is not definable, in the sense of establishing a strict delimitation of its semantic range. It's a projective interior space of undefined boundary in which people find it desirable to be.

The best we could do would be to record every named instance of an event which someone elects to describe as "good", as measured against disputing elections ("no, that wasn't good!"), and that would give you a constantly expanding semantic map of what in actuality is "good."

Even that, though doable, would be tricky, insofar as most occurrences of "good" simply beg the question "good for what?", which people rarely want or are able to answer sufficiently because it lets slip the truth, namely, that the Good is a Name.

You're missing the point. The "thing" obviously exists in this universe or we wouldn't name it. The point is not that a rock is a rock and not a tree but rather where both came from. Moreover, the "good" most certainly is definable as evidenced by the Moral Law. It's, again, not a question of whether or not the Moral Law exists but rather where it came from and that and that alone will answer your question, "Good for what."

Are you a sock-puppet for Bill-most-funny?

[Dioscuri]

"The right thing to do" in a given situation exists insofar as one can do it. But it is dependent upon a multitude of other factors that determine that action as being good.

The fact that "good" can be predicated of innumerable different events does not at all indicate that there a thing that is "The Good Itself", other than the Name "the Good Itself."

[Marcus]

"The right thing to do" in a given situation exists insofar as one can do it. But it is dependent upon a multitude of other factors that determine that action as being good.

The fact that "good" can be predicated of innumerable different events does not at all indicate that there a thing that is "The Good Itself", other than the Name "the Good Itself."

You can't be serious . . So I injure you and call it good, the name alone, calling it good makes it good?

Whoo-hoo . .

"Good" exists. What universe do you live in?

[Dioscuri]

You can't be serious . . So I injure you and call it good, the name alone, calling it good makes it good?

It makes it good for you.

Is this not precisely how politics works? The sides engage in no end of sleazy, deceptive, destructive-to-the-point-of-nihilistic-and-outright-criminal schemes and tricks, and at every step their partisans cheer the progress of virtue and decency.

Does this really surprise you?

[Marcus]

You can't be serious . . So I injure you and call it good, the name alone, calling it good makes it good?

It makes it good for you.

Again, what world do you live in? You should consider reading Lewis' The Abolition of Man.

C.S. Lewis's The Abolition of Man purports to be a book specifically about public education, but its central concerns are broadly political, religious, and philosophical. In the best of the book's three essays, "Men Without Chests," Lewis trains his laser-sharp wit on a mid- century English high school text, considering the ramifications of teaching British students to believe in idle relativism, and to reject "the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kinds of things we are." Lewis calls this doctrine the "Tao," and he spends much of the book explaining why society needs a sense of objective values. The Abolition of Man speaks with astonishing freshness to contemporary debates about morality; . .

Again, the question is how one's presuppositions define what does or doesn't exist. You're on a roll . . . making my point for me as it were . .

[Ibrahim]

Again, what world do you live in? You should consider reading Lewis' The Abolition of Man.

I wouldn't bother, Dio. Lewis is junk.


The general principle of relativism is sound, unless you personally opt for believing in one ultimate Truth or another, but to the outside observer this choice is arbitrary.

[Marcus]

Lewis is junk.

Sooey . . .

[Dioscuri]

I suppose our difference here, Marcus, is that you understand "first principles" to mean, "Things that I think it's important for people to believe because I think that believing those things makes people behave better."


I understand "first principles" to mean "statements of irrefutable certainty upon which all other statements rely."

[Marcus]

I suppose our difference here, Marcus, is that you understand "first principles" to mean, "Things that I think it's important for people to believe because I think that believing those things makes people behave better."

I understand "first principles" to mean "statements of irrefutable certainty upon which all other statements rely."

Not even close, nor should you presume to read my mind or patronize me with your silly insults. Are you a sock puppet for Bill-most-funny?

What I mean by "first principles" are those presuppositions that define what we accept with certainty.

I got 'em, you got 'em, everybody's got 'em . .

[Dioscuri]

Not even close, nor should you presume to read my mind or patronize me with your silly insults. Are you a sock puppet for Bill-most-funny?

I don't know who that is. And I'm not patronizing.

Would you be less scandalized if I said you might refer to those three elementary cognitions collectively as "Logos"?

What I mean by "first principles" are those presuppositions that define what we accept with certainty.

I got 'em, you got 'em, everybody's got 'em . .

What exactly do you mean by "accept"?

Certainty, or the Truth, is the unchallengeable. It is that before which one is powerless. So if you are speaking about a conscious decision to "accept" something, then anything accepted in that way, where you might just as well have rejected it, is not a Truth.

The Truth cannot be chosen nor rejected. The Truth Is, no matter what anyone says.

[Ibrahim]

True first principles are arrived at via foundationalism, and certainly you can doubt most of the things Marcus accepts as first principles. The certainties you can carefully construct via Cartesian methodology don't include faith, which can always be doubted. Its in a different category entirely.

[Marcus]

1) I don't know who that is. And I'm not patronizing.
2) Would you be less scandalized if I said you might refer to those three elementary cognitions collectively as "Logos"?
3) What exactly do you mean by "accept"?
4) Certainty, or the Truth, is the unchallengeable. It is that before which one is powerless. So if you are speaking about a conscious decision to "accept" something, then anything accepted in that way, where you might just as well have rejected it, is not a Truth.
5) The Truth cannot be chosen nor rejected. The Truth Is, no matter what anyone says.

1) Yes, you were.
2) I'm not "scandalized," only amused. And no.
3) Believe
4) No. Truth is defined by one's presuppositions.
5) No. The "truth" of whether Materialism or Atheism (and all subsequent "truth" proceeding from whichever) can be chosen/rejected.

[Ibrahim]

5) No. The "truth" of whether Materialism or Atheism (and all subsequent "truth" proceeding from whichever) can be chosen/rejected.

This is where your argument always falls down. There are some things that are not debatable, specifically the fact of being itself, as numerous schools of philosophy have identified.

In a way you're like a stillborn existentialist. You partially realize that existence precedes essence, but are unwilling to break from traditional theological systems that insist that being has a preordained purpose. Realizing that these systems are no longer defensible as anything but a subjective choice you insist that everything is a subjective choice and short-circuit the debate with "to each his own."

[Dioscuri]

But if you're choosing your presuppositions, aren't they then just ... suppositions?


For my part, my presuppositions chose me.

[Marcus]

1) But if you're choosing your presuppositions, aren't they then just ... suppositions?
2) For my part, my presuppositions chose me.

1) Exactly. And the most fundamental presupposition is the choice between Materialism or Theism, either of which belief can be changed at any time, but the fact that either of which are and must be presupposed cannot be changed. One "supposes" and then accepts that the essence of the cosmos is wholly material/impersonal/silent or one "supposes" the essence of the cosmos is intelligent/personal. Neither (pre)supposition can be proven, one or the other is simply presupposed and all existence is rationalized from there. The presupposed cosmic essence/eternal whatever thus defines the nature of existence. And of course a Theistic presupposition is open to many avenues of interpretation such a spiritualism, pantheism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.—the Materialistic much less so.

2) Exactly. Your basic presuppositions define, very fundamentally, what you henceforward can accept as fact. For instance, the Materialist cannot accept a cosmos with transcendent purpose, nor can a Theist accept a cosmos with its only purpose as imputed by the mind of man. The Theist can accept that the salmon return to this river at this time every year in order to give themselves to the people as food. The Materialist cannot accept such a notion.

[Ibrahim]

1) But if you're choosing your presuppositions, aren't they then just ... suppositions?
2) For my part, my presuppositions chose me.

1) Exactly. And the most fundamental presupposition is the choice between Materialism or Theism. One "supposes" and then accepts that the essence of the cosmos is wholly material/impersonal/silent or one "supposes" the essence of the cosmos is intelligent/personal. Neither supposition can be proven, one or the other is simply presupposed and all existence is rationalized from there.

2) Exactly. Your basic presuppositions define, very fundamentally, what you henceforward can accept as fact. For instance, the Materialist cannot accept a cosmos with transcendent purpose, nor can a Theist accept a cosmos with its only purpose as imputed by the mind of man.

This is entirely wrong because people do change their view from atheim to theism or, more commonly today, vice versa. This shows that your "fundamental presuppositions" can be changed at any time. Existence precedes essence.

[Demon of Undoing]

What if I'm not making a presupposition at all, but trying to find a model that best suits observation? Even when my conclusions came down on the traditional theism side, I tried to let truth determine belief, not belief determine truth.

The fact that you can interpret the same body of data either way, in almost every instance, tells me that God is very shy, and thus has Murphy deal with most of his interactions. Just to keep us humble.

[Dioscuri]

One "supposes" and then accepts that the essence of the cosmos is wholly material/impersonal/silent or one "supposes" the essence of the cosmos is intelligent/personal.

And you know which of those applies to me?

Your basic presuppositions define, very fundamentally, what you henceforward can accept as fact.

What you or anyone can accept as fact will be something that either is constituted by an interior/exterior, and/or is similar to and different from other facts, and can be Named.

I don't have faith in that. It is an irrefutable certainty.

For instance, the Materialist cannot accept a cosmos with transcendent purpose,

What's "transcendent"?

nor can a Theist accept a cosmos with its only purpose as imputed by the mind of man. The Theist can accept that the salmon return to this river at this time every year in order to give themselves to the people as food.

So, you can't accept a cosmos whose purpose is thinkable by the human mind, but you can accept a cosmos whose purpose is to service human needs.

Now we're getting somewhere! Please expand on this.

[Marcus]

What if I'm . . but trying to find a model that best suits observation? . .

Good question, but your presuppositions will define the model that best suits what you're observing. For instance, the Yupik will observe the annual return of the caribou, and his magic/mystic spirituality will conclude the caribou, brother creatures, are coming to give themselves to him. His world-view, his presuppositions, interpret and reinforce what he sees.

The Materialist, of course, will see no such thing. The Materialist will see patterns of behavior that have evolved in pursuit of the perpetuation of the species.

So which one is right? The Materialist who see nothing more than mindless, purposeless, and evolving biology or the Yupik who sees the cosmos as a giant and interconnected, spiritual arena? Or are they each looking at the opposite sides of the same coin?

Obviously some models are more successful, more internally consistent than others. That is not the point. The point is that our beliefs define our world, not the other way around. We are not born as blank slates; we are born into an inherited world-view, which we may or may not change. The important fact is that we observe our world through the glasses of our presuppositions.

[Marcus]

So, you can't accept a cosmos whose purpose is thinkable by the human mind, but you can accept a cosmos whose purpose is to service human needs.

Now we're getting somewhere! Please expand on this.

No, go jerk your own chain. I don't play those kind of games.

That's not what I said. What I did say was that our presuppositions define the cosmic essence. Nor did I come close to saying that human need constitutes cosmic purpose.

Don't try to be such a smart-ass. Say what you mean, up-front, and let it go at that. Some presuppositions are mutually exclusive, simple as that.

[Ibrahim]

What if I'm . . but trying to find a model that best suits observation? . .

Good question, but your presuppositions will define the model that best suits what you're observing. For instance, the Yupik will observe the annual return of the caribou, and his magic/mystic spirituality will conclude the caribou, brother creatures, are coming to give themselves to him. His world-view, his presuppositions, interpret and reinforce what he sees.

The Materialist, of course, will see no such thing. The Materialist will see patterns of behavior that have evolved in pursuit of the perpetuation of the species.

So which one is right? The Materialist who see nothing more than mindless, purposeless, and evolving biology or the Yupik who sees the cosmos as a giant and interconnected, spiritual arena? Or are they each looking at the opposite sides of the same coin?

You still haven't addressed the problem of people who change those views later in their life. They are not, then, presuppositions.

Obviously some models are more successful, more internally consistent than others.

Lemmie guess which ones.

The point is that our beliefs define our world, not the other way around.

Were this the case we never would have advanced beyond, for example, certain cosmological accounts.

The important fact is that we observe our world through the glasses of our presuppositions.

Except when those "presuppositions" change.

[Ibrahim]

Some presuppositions are mutually exclusive, simple as that.

Already refuted with the Descartes example.