Saudi Arabia's non-Islamic allies against Iran
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It has scarcely gone unnoticed inside the kingdom that, at least in regard to Iran, Riyadh has been speaking almost in concert with Jerusalem - an embarrassing situation that official announcements can neither hide nor satisfactorily justify. Intelligence reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has granted flyover rights for an Israeli attack on Iran and will help refuel returning aircraft. Reports will merge freely with popular lore and take on greater magnitude.
Cooperation with Israel has required lowering the priority of the Palestinian issue for the time being. The plight of the Palestinians has long been prominent in the Saudi public mind, but it is appearing to be merely something their rulers invoke when it suits them.
Paradoxically, and quite obviously as well, Iran has been more consistent with its support for the Palestinians by backing Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is thought to have led to Saudi acquiescence to Israeli attacks on the Iranian proxies.
Conspiracies are very much part of Saudi folklore and foreign manipulation of Muslims is a recurring theme - an unsurprising legacy of Ottoman, British and US intrigues. It will take little encouragement for many to believe that the impetus to war with Iran comes from the machinations of Israeli and American bureaus.
(Curiously, Israelis worry that the US, European Union and Saudi Arabia will, upon settling the Iranian matter, plot to turn their concerted attention to imposing a Palestinian settlement on Jerusalem.)
Sunni discontent will be most pronounced in the Wahhabi clergy and traditionalist tribes, especially in those who are irked by the House of Saud's impious allies and who are not overly influenced by the exuberant rulers and generals bruiting their victory over the Shiites.
Similarly, Saudi youth may be unimpressed by the victory and more concerned by lack of opportunity and the barrenness of subsidized lifestyles. For many of them, the Sunni-Shi'ite, Arab-Persian rivalry is irrelevant and akin to the absurd rallying cries of the dictators who are receding in relevance in the Middle East, though not quickly enough.
War and its aftermath will shape the course of the momentous succession dynamics that are forming as the sons of the old warrior king are well into old age and quite apparently infirm and often doddering.
A large number of men, some several thousand, can rightfully lay claim to be princes. Many of them resent the concentrated power of the dominant Sudairi clique and the very notion of a family-run state in the 21st century. They will press for greater opportunity and perhaps also for moving with the tide of change all around them. More than a few princesses may join them.
Shi'ite unrest
Saudi Arabia, though predominantly Sunni, has a Shi'ite minority of 10-15% that is concentrated in the oil-rich east and in the strategically important southwest. They do not have the same access to work and education of the Sunnis and are increasingly vocal in their protests.
Their position in national life has always been colored by their sectarian beliefs, no more so than in 1979 when some openly protested after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for Islamist uprisings. They were swiftly crushed by Saudi security forces.
More recently, when Shi'ites joined with young Sunnis to ask for greater voice in their country's affairs, they were suppressed - less forcefully this time. The Saudi state was convinced, with little if any evidence, that they were directed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
War on Iran could lead to two Shi'ite responses inside the kingdom. First, there could be a purely indigenous movement, chiefly peaceful, that would repeat previous efforts to attain equal treatment. Angered by recent repression and encouraged by recent movements in Libya and Syria, the Shi'ites could defy state edicts and assemble peacefully, willing to endure suppression by security forces.
Second, a Shi'ite response could have international aspects, including ones quite worrisome for regional security. Iran, if attacked, will not sit back like a chastened student. It will strike back - in and out of the region, wisely or not, but reasonably swiftly and certainly violently.
The IRGC, it might be more than suspected, has been busily laying out responses for some time now. It could deploy its own personnel skilled in bomb-making and other guerrilla operations. To use the old insurgency maxim, these Iranian fish may find welcoming Shi'ite oceans in vital parts of Saudi Arabia. Their targets could include oil facilities, security forces, and even members of the ruling family.
Iran may look to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier as a base of operations. Already armed and operating there are the Houthis - a Shi'ite tribal movement that fights encroachments by the Yemeni government and its Saudi backers. Several thousand strong, the Houthis raid on both sides of the frontier and will provide sanctuaries for IRGC guerrillas to use for operations just to the north inside Saudi Arabia.
Despite Saudi allegations, there has thus far been little evidence of Iranian influence with the Shi'ites on either side of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. A war on Iran, however, might make that influence both real and problematic.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author
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Wahhabism neck must be broken
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