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asymmetric Turkish-Iranian “soft” partition of the Arab republics
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NYT
January 5, 2012
In the Arab Spring, Watch Turkey
By JASON PACK and MARTIN VAN CREVELD
During the last decade many right-wing American and Israeli analysts have described the geostrategic struggles unfolding in the Middle East as a new “Cold War” pitting the United States against Shiite Iran. They have warned of an Arab “Shiite Crescent” — stretching from Lebanon to Iraq — connected to Iran via ties of religion, commerce and geostrategy.
The new year has started with an attempted Shiite power play by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to dominate the Iraqi government, and an Iranian demonstration of missile and nuclear fuel-rod capacity coupled with threats to close the Straits of Hormuz if Iranian oil exports are blocked.
These events can be interpreted as ample evidence of Iranian expansionism and combined with fears that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon, rendering its present regime and regional clients untouchable.
What this view of the Middle East overlooks is the fact that both the United States and Iran are mired in internal political and economic difficulties. Simultaneously, inside the region, both are being outmaneuvered by an ascendant Turkey.
Moreover, Western observers have missed the primary thread of events — namely, the ongoing asymmetric Turkish-Iranian “soft” partition of the Arab republics. Concomitantly, the American position as regional hegemon is vanishing. Today, only the Arab monarchies and Israel continue to look to the United States as their primary patron.
To investigate how these changing dynamics are seen by actors within the region, one of us (Jason Pack) spent his Christmas holidays in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or K.R.G., in Iraq. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, K.R.G. officials bemoaned their need of a regional patron to protect them from dominance by Baghdad.
Landlocked Iraqi Kurdistan also needs a conduit to export its oil to the West. The only country that can fulfill both roles is Turkey. That is why K.R.G. officials, instead of supporting their ethnic brethren inside Turkey, have often sided with Ankara against the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K.
All this explains why the bombing on Dec. 28, in which the Turks killed 35 Kurdish smugglers whom they mistook for terrorists, provoked little outrage in Iraqi Kurdistan. On the streets of Erbil there are no signs of protests against Turkey. Instead, one notices Turkey’s ubiquitous presence in the form of construction, investment, consumer goods and tourists.
Should more pipelines leading from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Mediterranean via Turkey be built, the result will be the de facto creation of an Iraqi-Kurdish buffer state. Dependent on Turkey for its survival, such a state would also form a barrier to Iranian (or American, or P.K.K.) interference in Turkish affairs.
In the southern part of Iraq, the situation is just the opposite. There, a Shiite Arab buffer state, buttressed by Iran as a bulwark against Turkish, American or Saudi encroachments, is being created. The last two weeks’ events have removed any doubt that Maliki is “Iran’s man” in Baghdad. Yet despite this de facto partitioning of Iraq over the last month, Turkey and Iran are not challenging each other’s spheres of influence.
In post-Arab Spring North Africa, too, Turkey and Iran have essentially partitioned the resurgent Islamist movements between themselves. The Turks support the victorious “moderate” Islamists from Tunisia to Egypt. Iran backs the Salafist spoilers, even though they are Sunni. In the Egyptian and Tunisian elections, and in Libya’s inter-militia civil strife, both wings of Islamist opinion have supported each other against Western-backed secularists and neo-liberals.
Since North Africa lacks indigenous Shiite populations and the “moderate” Islamists have now emerged as the main players in the region, it is Sunni Turkey, along with Qatar, that appears to be the rising political and commercial patron in North Africa.
Turkey’s approach to the problem of Israel/Palestine has also been converging with that of Iran. From the 1950s until 2002, secular military elites in Ankara enjoyed a privileged political and economic relationship with the West. They also developed intimate defense ties with Israel and NATO.
Since then, however, Turkey has drifted out of the Western security orbit. First it opposed the 2003 Iraq war; next, after the 2010 Gaza flotilla resulted in the death of nine Turks in international waters, it increasingly switched to the Palestinian side of the conflict.
Only in Syria are Turkey and Iran seemingly on opposite sides of a military conflict. Whereas Iran and its client Hezbollah back the Assad regime, the Turks arm, train and provide safe haven to the Syrian rebels. However, this conflict may be more apparent than real. In a fragmented post-Assad Syria, Turkey will support the Sunnis, while Iran will remain the patron of the Alawites. Moreover, both will surely find a way to protect their strategic and financial interests in whatever regime emerges.
Throughout 2011, the continued Western obsession with the Iranian nuclear menace prevented policy makers from grasping the most salient dynamic at play in the new Middle East. Those who, like Mohammed Ayoob of Michigan State University, have warned that “beyond the Arab democratic wave” lies a “Turko-Persian future” have been mostly ignored.
The Arab Spring has vastly weakened the Arab states, leaving them open to fragmentation, increased federalism and outside penetration. With hindsight, 2011 may come to represent as sharp a rupture in the political landscape of the Middle East as 1919 did.
Back then, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the British and French divided the Arab Middle East among themselves, with Britain as the senior partner. In today’s soft partition of the region, the weaker, less stable partner is Iran. The true victor of the Arab Spring is surely a resurgent Turkey.
Jason Pack researches Libyan history at Cambridge University and is president of Libya-Analysis.com. Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, is the author, most recently, of “The Age of Airpower.”
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And , analysis of NYT article in Turkish papers :
Turkish-Iranian solidarity in the Middle East ?
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Turkish-Iranian solidarity in the Middle East?
Most of the recent articles appearing in Western media about Turkish foreign policy in the context of the Arab Spring refers to two phenomena. The most visible one is the talk about the Turkish model as a source of emulation by the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated parties. The second one refers to the emergence of a Turkish-Iranian “Cold War” in the region.
The most obvious dimensions of this Persian-Turkish rivalry are centered in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon where Turkey seeks to contain and counter Iran’s sectarian support of Shiite groups. One can add to the growing Turkish-Iranian divergence Ankara’s decision to host NATO missile defense radars. Although Ankara has tried hard to deny this fact, NATO missiles are mostly designed to defend Eastern Europe from possible Iranian aggression. It is therefore not surprising that Turkish-Iranian relations have significantly deteriorated in the last few months since Turkey’s pro-NATO decision to host these radars.
Given this obvious Turkish-Iranian divergence, it is not very often that you see articles in the Western media that still talk about a Turkish-Iranian pro-Islamic solidarity in the context of the Arab Spring. I was therefore quite surprised by a recent op-ed in The New York Times by Jason Pack and Martin Van Creveld, who argued that “Western observers have missed the primary thread of events -- namely, the ongoing asymmetric Turkish-Iranian ‘soft’ partition of the Arab republics.”
The article acknowledges that Turkey and Iran are engaged in a rivalry over Iraq, with Tehran maintaining supremacy over Baghdad while Ankara has growing power over Iraqi Kurdistan. But beyond that they maintain that “Turkey and Iran are not challenging each other’s spheres of influence.” They argue that “in post-Arab Spring North Africa, Turkey and Iran have essentially partitioned the resurgent Islamist movements between themselves. The Turks support the victorious ‘moderate’ Islamists from Tunisia to Egypt. Iran backs the Salafist spoilers, even though they are Sunni. In the Egyptian and Tunisian elections, and in Libya’s inter-militia civil strife, both wings of Islamist opinion have supported each other against Western-backed secularists and neo-liberals. Since North Africa lacks indigenous Shiite populations and the ‘moderate’ Islamists have now emerged as the main players in the region, it is Sunni Turkey, along with Qatar, that appears to be the rising political and commercial patron in North Africa.”
Such a view depicting a Turkish-Iranian decision not to challenge each other’s sphere of influence is highly misleading. It is hard to understand why the authors overlook the very obvious Turkish-Iranian rivalry in Syria where Tehran is trying hard to keep the Assad regime in place while Turkey blatantly supports the Syrian opposition. When they finally mention this fact they try to argue that “this conflict may be more apparent than real.” and that “in a fragmented post-Assad Syria, Turkey will support the Sunnis, while Iran will remain the patron of the Alawites. Moreover, both will surely find a way to protect their strategic and financial interests in whatever regime emerges.” So what? This does not change the reality that Turkey and Iran are in opposite camps in Syria. Similarly, Turkey and Iran are in opposite camps when it comes to Lebanon. Turkey is often closer to the Sunni and pro-West Hariri camp, while Iran is the main supporter of Hezbollah.
It was the last section of the op-ed that gave away its main point when it argued that “Turkey’s approach to the problem of Israel/Palestine has also been converging with that of Iran. From the 1950s until 2002, secular military elites in Ankara enjoyed a privileged political and economic relationship with the West. They also developed intimate defense ties with Israel and NATO. Since then, however, Turkey has drifted out of the Western security orbit. First it opposed the 2003 Iraq war; next, after the 2010 Gaza flotilla resulted in the death of nine Turks in international waters, it increasingly switched to the Palestinian side of the conflict.”
Such attempts to put Turkey and Iran in the same “Islamic” camp ignore Ankara’s recent pro-NATO decision concerning missile defense and all of Ankara’s efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel during 2007 and 2008. Can you imagine an Iran that wants peace between Israel and Syria. Yet, this is exactly what the Justice and Development Party (AKP) tried to achieve for two years. A reality check is in order before sweeping arguments about an anti-Israeli Islamic solidarity between Turkey and Iran.
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Ibrahim, you have the mike
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