Endovelico wrote:Ukraine is about to experience two events (or two non-events, depending on how things shake out). One of them is an IMF credit of up to $17 billion (and change). The other is the resumption of fighting on the Donbass.
As I see it,
resumption of fighting in Donbass is a low probability risk.
On the side of Kiev: one should not underestimate the magnitude of defeat suffered by pro-Kiev forces last August, then last January/February, nor the weakening of resolve on their part.
Given that Russia has proven that she will support pro-Donetsk forces no matter what, given that NATO countries military intervention in Donbass is out of question, there is nothing to be gained by Kiev by further attacks but more and worse trouble. I have trouble to imagine even the most pro-US Ukrainians failing to see that.
On the side of Donetsk: no resumption of fighting is possible without Moscow's authorization, since pro-Donetsk Ukrainians depend on Russian military supplies. But a resumption of fighting is definitly not in Russia's interest, since
- the minimum objective has already been reached - Ukraine cannot fully switch to pro-NATO side since Donbass Ukrainians wouldn't allow it and Minsk-2 agreement calls for Ukrainian constitutional reform giving Donbass a say in it
- and nothing really important would be gained by further fighting, while costs would be large - public humiliation of France and Germany's commitment to Minsk-2 peace agreement would lead to solidification of NATO under US command instead of present distanciation and specific policy by both Berlin and Paris
The relevant and crucial question about Ukraine crisis is
whether the Ukrainian government will be stable. IMF credit is part of that question, but only a part, moreover its effects would not necessarily be globally positive, since IMF "favours" come with strings attached, forced economic reforms which often tend to aggravate the concerned country's difficulties - ask Athens to tell about that, and countless Third World countries before Greece.
Current deep economic crisis and recession could, or not, give way to default and depression. Government which has to face the aftermath of defeat, plus serious impoverishment of most Ukrainians, may or may not hold against its (former?) extremist nationalist allies, the likes of Pravyi Sector, Svoboda and Liachko.
Angry warnings of a new coup d'état if the government was not behaving the way extremists would like have been remarked. Some armed units which took part in the Donbass war are distinct from the Army, under no governmental effective control, often populated by many extremists, and financed by oligarchs. If they took to action, who would stop them? The Army might... but they have proven since beginning 2014 to be the most reluctant to take sides in civil strife.
Then you have actions by external countries. The most interesting fact about 600 US paratroopers beginning this month their training Ukrainians near Lviv is that
they will not be training Ukrainian Army, but the "National Guard" that is the special units formed for the Donbass war and populated by many extremists. Which calls the question: what will these NG units use their new talents on? And also another question: what are the interests and objectives of the US government on Ukraine? Let everything calm down... or push for further trouble and generate a failed State close both to Russia and to the EU?
It's quite possible Poroshenko will at some point have to choose between physical elimination of extremist leaders and dismantlement of their units on the one hand - and fleeing the country à la Yanukovitch on the other hand. In such a case, would he have the resolve? More importantly, would he be obeyed?
