On the Nature of Things | Forum

{Interior/Exterior} <> Name <> {Identity/Difference}

Interesting. But is it not possible to define Identity/Difference as a special class of Interior/Exterior? It seems like a simple double iteration of the first class.

A IN B; A NOT IN B;
X IN (Group of things that are very much like X), Y IN (Group of things that are very much like X); X IN (Group of things that are very much like X), Y NOT IN (Group of things that are very much like X)

...
To take it further, dow do you define interior/exterior? By using labels. So when determining whether dog is in mammal, you go along a list of labels, and each label is weighted by importance.
So I would argue that all you need are Names, an AND function to compare which of the labels of NameX and the labels of NameY match, and a way to sum up the result of the comparison (weights).

Dioscuri wrote: Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

persistence? moments?

Sounds to me like you're using time-concepts to define time.

Taboo wrote:

{Interior/Exterior} <> Name <> {Identity/Difference}

Interesting. But is it not possible to define Identity/Difference as a special class of Interior/Exterior? It seems like a simple double iteration of the first class.

A IN B; A NOT IN B;
X IN (Group of things that are very much like X), Y IN (Group of things that are very much like X); X IN (Group of things that are very much like X), Y NOT IN (Group of things that are very much like X)

...
To take it further, dow do you define interior/exterior? By using labels. So when determining whether dog is in mammal, you go along a list of labels, and each label is weighted by importance.
So I would argue that all you need are Names, an AND function to compare which of the labels of NameX and the labels of NameY match, and a way to sum up the result of the comparison (weights).

Alas, speakingbeings cannot but deal with approximations. One is always dividing into Two, and the illusion of coherence always depends upon a Third.

Interior/Exterior and Same/Different are placeholders for analogous but not identical places. Think of them as second and third dimensions.

Dioscuri wrote: Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

persistence? moments?

Sounds to me like you're using time-concepts to define time.

Only if you presume any series is already a temporal concept. If you do that, then Number itself is a temporal concept, and the only non-temporal concept is One. (Which cannot be discounted as a possibility).

Parodite wrote:The existence or non-existence of (a) God cannot be proven or disproven. Does this however mean that the explicit non-belief that such a God exists is the only possible alternatief to a belief in that God? Think not. There is the possibility of shrugging your shoulders and say "Hu? No idea..." In that case there is no action that expresses a belief nor the explicit rejection of its content. Hence, it would not make sense to claim that such non- action is also a statement of "faith".

If the above is sound, the next question is if it is possible to also passively shrug your shoulders and say "Hu? I don't know.." (nor even really care....) on something like the acclaimed first principle of faith/trust/belief or any other first principle stand-in. Is it?

If {The existence or non-existence of (a) God cannot be proven or disproven.} then why should anyone believe in this?

Since there are a literal infinity of other [Nouns] for which {the existence or non-existence of [Noun] cannot be proven or disproven.} and yet we do not choose to believe in any of those, it follows that there must be a secondary reason why people choose to believe when the [Noun] happens to be [God]. People have an emotional attachment to the concept.

The only rational reaction to questions on the truth-value of [Nouns] for which {the existence or non-existence of [Noun] cannot be proven or disproven.} is to reject {[Noun is True] and [Noun is not True]}.

Dioscuri wrote: Alas, speakingbeings cannot but deal with approximations. One is always dividing into Two, and the illusion of coherence always depends upon a Third.

Interior/Exterior and Same/Different are placeholders for analogous but not identical places. Think of them as second and third dimensions.

Ok, but what is the analogous first dimension in that case?

Dioscuri wrote: Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

persistence? moments?
Sounds to me like you're using time-concepts to define time.

Only if you presume any series is already a temporal concept. If you do that, then Number itself is a temporal concept, and the only non-temporal concept is One. (Which cannot be discounted as a possibility).

I can't pretend to understand how humans perceive time, so I will refrain from further comment, except to say that the explanation of the perception of time as nothing but a series of changes leaves me unsatisfied. Time seems built into our biological machinery, sort of a primitive unto itself.

Would a disembodied brain with no external senses lack temporal perception? Is examination of differences in one's own mental states sufficient to establish temporality?

Taboo wrote:

Dioscuri wrote: Alas, speakingbeings cannot but deal with approximations. One is always dividing into Two, and the illusion of coherence always depends upon a Third.

Interior/Exterior and Same/Different are placeholders for analogous but not identical places. Think of them as second and third dimensions.

Ok, but what is the analogous first dimension in that case?

The Name of the One, of course.

Dioscuri wrote: Time, for instance, is entirely an interplay of the persistence of Identities and their differences from themselves over the course of multiple moments.

persistence? moments?
Sounds to me like you're using time-concepts to define time.

Only if you presume any series is already a temporal concept. If you do that, then Number itself is a temporal concept, and the only non-temporal concept is One. (Which cannot be discounted as a possibility).

I can't pretend to understand how humans perceive time, so I will refrain from further comment, except to say that the explanation of the perception of time as nothing but a series of changes leaves me unsatisfied. Time seems built into our biological machinery, sort of a primitive unto itself.

Would a disembodied brain with no external senses lack temporal perception? Is examination of differences in one's own mental states sufficient to establish temporality?

It would seem that changes in the energy activation-space of the neurons must coincide with temporality. The syntax of the universe is made of flows and stops.

I'm gonna get smashed for this, but I prefer Spengler's (Ozzie) definition of time as the direction of Becoming. The time being spoken of above is in reality Duration, and is a merely function of human consciousness; namely the function of narratization that takes a series of perceptions and makes a coherent story out of them. Time can be experienced at higher or lower intensities, and the space (space is really the key word here, for our common sense definitions of time are in reality derived from the sense of spatiality) between two ticks can be slowed to a near eternity or sped up such that hours pass without our knowledge. Lacking the capacity of narratization, there would be no experience of Duration, no perception or reason to believe that one moment connects with another in a seamless ribbon that proceeds at a uniform pace (again, we are talking in spatial terms; it cannot be helped when speaking of Duration). But that same creature, living in a continually timeless now, would nevertheless have pre-rational understanding of the Time, the direction of Becoming; of the reality, for example, that it is not reversible.