Rühle's thesis of possible 2010 Iranian test in North Korea is obviously speculative.
Still, if it was true, it would fit very well the global picture of Iranian nuclear program, and in fact
make it more coherent:
- Iran is supposed to have had several thousands of centrifugating units operational for a few years now: 1,600 in activity by 2002 / 4,000 or 7,000 by 2009 according to various reports
- Even assuming complete failure at mastering the "P2" advanced design of centrifuges (performance = 5 SWU / year) and Iran having sticked with "P1" basic design (performance = 2 SWU /year), this would still amount to about 20 to 50 thousands SWU performed in Iranian enrichment plants (SWU is "separative work unit", the unit of work in uranium enrichment)
- Enriching 1 kg of uranium to military-grade level costs 227 SWU, and a nuclear bomb can be made with 7 to 21 kg of military-grade uranium, depending on the builder's technical proficiency. Meaning that material for an uranium bomb needs 1,600 to 4,800 SWU
- Even assuming large losses in productivity as a result of "Stuxnet" Israeli computer virus, even allowing for a fair amount of uranium enrichment devoted to preparing fuel for nuclear power stations, even assuming that Iranian bomb builders need 21 kg enriched uranium per bomb,
the conclusion seems unescapable that Iran has already enriched uranium for at least one, probably several, possibly a fair number of nuclear bombs
Look up also:
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340 ... 86,00.html (Israeli MI chief: "Iran can produce 4 bombs")
Which leaves only two possible interpretations:
-
Either Iranian government is fully sincere that their one and only goal is to produce fuel for nuclear power... and they have produced a heck of a lot low enriched uranium
-
Or Iranian government is less than fully sincere, they pursue both civilian and military nuclear aims... and they already have material for probably several bombs
This would obviously make it a very real possibility that they would have wanted to perform an unpublished nuclear test. North Korea has been a partner of Iran for a long time: Shahab-3, the bulk of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles, are locally produced versions of No-Dong 1 North Korean design. The fact that this test would have been less than 1 kt TNT does not necessarily mean it was a fizzle: it could have been small by design, so as to make it harder to detect and yet get useful information to confirm engineering assumptions.
Incidentally, secret cooperation between aspiring / recent nuclear powers is nothing new:
- It's De Gaulle's 1958 return to power in France that stopped German nuclear weapon program, until then conducted under "European" disguise in secret cooperation with France and Italy (De Gaulle is supposed to have privately explained: "The bodies are not yet cold", and also: "It's a casus belli for the Russians")
- Israeli observers are said to have been present at the first French nuclear test, while France was building Dimona the Israeli nuclear weapons factory
- The Vela incident (1979) was very probably the accidental detection by US satellite of a clandestine Israeli-South African nuclear test
- Pakistan is generally assumed to have had a Chinese design as first design for a nuclear bomb
- etc...
Of course the logic of nuclear deterrence is universal, and Iran would be highly vulnerable to Israeli nuclear reprisal, if nuclear-tipped Iranian missiles struck Israeli cities. That being said, Iranian government rhetoric about puting an end to the State of Israel branded a "cancerous tumor" is understandably getting on the nerves of many an Israeli.
The short version being: "
Israelis don't want to run a 10% risk to be 100% destroyed"
HOW not to run that risk, when a potential opponent already has produced fissile material for several bombs, is the relevant question.
...Israelis might choose to run the (many) risks of an attack uncoordinated with America, in the hope of destroying for many years the possibility for Iran to add on its arsenal, calculating that a country with a couple operational warheads would need to stand much quieter than a country with several dozens of them.